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Executive Summary: 
The last two decades have seen a growing concern about rising inequality. In a recent 
book (2012), Economics Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz argues that rising income 
inequality is one of the main factors underlying the economic and financial crisis in the 
United States. Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) similarly assert that higher inequality has 
harmful social consequences. This trend of growing inequality has furthermore been 
condemned in public arenas, where protests in the United States (the “Occupy Wall 
Street” movement) and in Spain (the “indignados”) show the extent of widespread public 
dissatisfaction with the present system which is denounced as being fundamentally 
flawed and unfair. The “We are the 99%” slogan and the associated web blog “We are 
the 99 percent” are direct references to this growing unequal distribution of wealth. A 
common rallying point of these movements is the argument that bankers who have 
benefited from large bonuses have been protected by bailout measures, while the victims 
of the crisis brought on by these very same bankers are faced with the reality of rising 
unemployment. This has also recently led the EU to agree on capping bonuses to bankers.  
Within this context, the European Commission 1  decided last year to undertake a 
comprehensive study on the social and economic challenges associated with rising 
income inequality in Europe. This report constitutes the third deliverable of this global 
study. The first report includes a literature review on the relationship between income 
inequality and social outcome variables in the areas of happiness, criminality, health, 
social capital, education, voting behavior and female labor participation (d'Hombres, 
Weber, & Elia, 2012). The second report complements the literature review by 
examining the bivariate correlations on NUTS1 level between income inequality and the 
social outcomes mentioned above (Elia, d'Hombres, Weber, & Saltelli, 2013). However, 
since the analysis in the second report relied on bivariate correlations, none of the 
statistical associations could be regarded as evidence of a causal relationship. In this third 
report, we carry out a multivariate analysis on a selected number of social outcomes 
while controlling for a multitude of individual and country level specificities. The social 
                                                           
1 Joint cooperation between the Directorate General Joint Research Centre (DG JRC) and the Directorate 
General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (DG EMPL) 
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outcomes are social capital, i.e. trust and participation in organizations, happiness and 
health. 
This study suggests that the adverse effect of income inequality on a plurality of societal 
development challenges as proposed by Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) cannot be 
confirmed by the data, except for the case of trust. In particular, our analysis cannot 
confirm the hypothesis of a strong and significant effect of income inequality on health, 
happiness and participation in associational activities.  
However, we show that income inequality has a potential damaging effect on trust 
in Europe. A negative association between income disparities and generalized trust is 
reported in all estimations presented in this report. Though these findings need to be 
considered with care given that they might be specific to the countries sampled or the 
time period covered, the implication of a significant effect of inequality on trust should 
not be discounted. According to a variety of scholars, trust is critical for the functioning 
of societies (Putnam, 2000). Social capital and trust are factors which are linked to 
cooperative behaviors and investment decisions as well as to the quality of institutions, 
which in turn are all key factors of economic performance (Knack and Keefer, 1996, 
and Guiso et al 2004).  
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1. Introduction 
The last two decades have been marked by a growing concern about rising inequality. In 
a recent book (2012), Economics Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz argues that rising income 
inequality is one of the main factors underlying the economic and financial crisis in the 
United States. In October 2012, The Economist magazine has also devoted a special 
report on income inequality in the world.2  
The growing inequality has also been condemned in public arenas. Protesters in the 
United States (the Occupy Wall Street movement) and in Spain (the indignados) have 
denounced the present system as fundamentally flawed and unfair. The “We are the 99%” 
slogan and the associated web blog “We are the 99 percent” (see 
http://wearethe99percent.tumblr.com/) also refer to this growing unequal distribution of 
wealth. A common rallying point of these movements is the argument that bankers who 
have benefited from large bonuses have been protected by bailout measures, while the 
victims of the crisis brought about on by these very same bankers are faced with the 
reality of rising unemployment. This has also recently led the EU to agree on capping 
bonuses to bankers.  
The development of income inequality in the EU Member States has been the subject of a 
recent publication by the OECD (2011). The report highlights a general trend of 
widening income disparities. While in the 1980s the Gini coefficient was equal to around 
0.29 in OECD countries it markedly rose to 0.32 in the late 2000s. Particularly striking is 
the increase in income inequality of former equal societies, such as the Nordic countries 
and Germany. The causes of this rising income inequality in the past decades have also 
attracted much political and scholarly attention. The OECD (2011) report provides a 
wealth of explanatory mechanisms, ranging from rising wage inequality to different 
taxation policies and household structures.  
A different perspective is to look at the social and economic challenges associated with 
rising income inequalities in the EU, i.e. to ask whether and why we should pay attention 
                                                           
2 See http://www.economist.com/node/21564414 for additional information. 
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to the growing polarization between the 1% and the 99% of the population. These 
questions gained prominence through a widely cited book by Richard Wilkinson and 
Kate Pickett entitled “The Spirit Level, Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do 
Better” (2009). Although the authors main tenet that more equal societies perform better 
on a wide range of social outcomes is intuitive and straightforward, the empirical tests 
are based on bivariate correlations at national level, implying that the authors fail to 
control for other numerous factors, which might have had an impact on both the social 
outcomes and income inequality. 3  The empirical associations reported in their book 
might thus lead to misleading causal inferences.  
The book of Wilkinson and Pickett, which attracted a lot of attention, called for a more 
careful analysis of the consequences of rising income inequality. Last year, the European 
Commission 4  thus decided to undertake a comprehensive study on the social and 
economic challenges associated with rising income inequality in Europe. The present 
report is the third and last outcome of this study. The first report includes a literature 
review on the relationship between income inequality and social outcome variables in the 
area of happiness, criminality, health, social capital, education, voting behavior and 
female labor participation (d'Hombres, Weber, & Elia, 2012). The second report 
complements the literature review by examining the bivariate correlations on NUTS1 
level between income inequality and the social outcomes mentioned above (Elia, 
d'Hombres, Weber, & Saltelli, 2013). This report shows that, in Europe and at NUTS1 
level, we observe significant bivariate correlations between higher income inequality and 
(i) lower recorded voter turnout, (ii) lower participation in voluntary organizations, (iii) 
higher crime rates, (iv) higher early school leaver rates, (v) lower level of trust and (vi) 
self-reported voting behaviors. Conversely, the social outcomes related to well-being and 
health were found not to be significantly associated with income disparities. However, 
since this analysis relied on bivariate correlations none of the statistical associations 
could be regarded as evidence of a causal relationship. In this third report, we carry out a 
                                                           
3 See http://www.equalitytrust.org.uk/resources/ for a list of refutations and counter-refutations linked to 
the empirical analysis.  
4 Joint cooperation between the Directorate General Joint Research Centre (DG JRC) and the Directorate 
General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (DG EMPL) 
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multivariate analysis on a selected number of social outcomes while controlling for a 
multitude of individual and country level specificities. The social outcomes studied in 
this report are health, social capital, i.e. trust and participation in organizations, and 
happiness.  
The report is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the estimation method and the 
data employed for the empirical investigations. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 constitute the core of 
the report and present the multivariate analyses of the effect of income inequality on 
social capital, happiness and health respectively. We first discuss the expected effect of 
income inequality on the social outcome under scrutiny and review the relevant empirical 
literature. After having explained how the empirical analysis has been carried out, we 
then present our main findings. Finally, we check the robustness of the results in relation 
to the underlying sample sizes and estimation strategies. Chapter 6 concludes the report.  
Our results refute most of Wilkinson and Pickett’s (2009) argument that there is a clear, 
robust and strong impact of income inequality on various social outcomes. In particular, 
health, happiness and participation in associational activities do not seem to be 
significantly associated with income inequality in a multivariate context. These results 
are robust to the inclusion of a large number of individual and country-specific variables 
and different estimation strategies. While there are very good reasons to be worried about 
growing income inequality, the data does not provide support for a direct relationship 
between income inequality and these social outcomes. Certainly, income inequality is 
correlated with several other country characteristics, which once taken into account fade 
away the associations reported in Wilkinson and Pickett (2009). However, the empirical 
analysis presented in this report suggests that, in Europe, income inequality has a 
detrimental effect on the level of generalized trust. This association seems to be robust to 
the inclusion of a wide range of control variables and estimation methods. If, as argued 
by Kenneth Arrow (1972, p 357), “it can be plausibly argued that much of the economic 
backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence”, there are 
all the reasons to be concerned with the negative association reported in this report 
between income inequality and trust, letting even apart the social justice motivations 
behind the fight against growing disparities. 
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2. Methodology and data source 
 
2.1 Data sources 
To carry out the empirical analysis presented in this report, we have matched data from 
five different sources. First, we rely on the European Values Study (EVS) to measure the 
social outcomes (except the life expectancy indicator) and all individual level variables 
used in the estimations.  
 
Table 2.1: Countries participation to EVS 
Country 1981-1984 1990-1993 1999-2001 2008-2010 
Austria  * * * 
Belgium * * * * 
Bulgaria  * * * 
Czech Republic  * * * 
Cyprus    * 
Denmark * * * * 
Estonia  * * * 
Finland  * * * 
France * * * * 
Germany * * * * 
Great Britain * * * * 
Greece   * * 
Hungary  * * * 
Iceland * * * * 
Ireland * * * * 
Italy * * * * 
Latvia  * * * 
Lithuania  * * * 
Luxembourg   * * 
Malta * * * * 
Netherlands * * * * 
Poland  * * * 
Portugal  * * * 
Romania  * * * 
Slovak Republic  * * * 
Slovenia  * * * 
Spain * * * * 
Sweden * * * * 
Note: Countries participation to a specific EVS wave are denoted by an asterisk. 
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The EVS was first launched in 1981, with the field work taking place over the period 
1981-1983. Three additional waves followed, respectively in 1990, 1999 and 2008. For 
these three waves, the field work was implemented respectively over the period 1990-
1993, 1999-2001 and 2008-2010. In Table 2.1, we report the EU countries participating 
to each wave of the EVS. Eleven European countries participated to the first wave while 
24 and 26 were part of respectively the second and third waves. Finally, all EU countries 
are included in the last wave of the EVS. The EVS is a large scale, cross country and 
repeated survey that provides information on the socioeconomic characteristics, ideas, 
beliefs, preferences, attitudes, values and opinions of citizens of the persons interviewed. 
The average country sample size is approximately 1500. In each country the sample is 
representative of the adult population of 18 years and older who are resident within 
private households, regardless of nationality and citizenship or language.5 
Second, we employ the World Development Indicators (WDI) and the World Economic 
Outlook Database (WEO) to gather country-specific information. The WDI database 
includes more than 1,000 indicators for 216 economies, with long time series going back 
to 1960 while the WEO is focused on macroeconomic data series with data available 
since 1980 for 180 countries. 6  When an indicator used in the empirical analysis is 
available in both datasets, we have selected the one from the WEO as this database 
contains less missing values than the WDI. The 27 EU countries are covered by both 
datasets, though with some missing data. Note that one indicator used in the empirical 
analysis has been also taken from OECD Health Data (OECD, 2012).7  
Finally, our measure of income disparity - the GINI coefficient - is taken from the World 
Income Inequality Database (WIID) provided by the United Nations University – World 
Institute for Development Economics Research. The updated data of the Deininger and 
Squire (1996) from World Bank, the unit record data of the Luxembourg Income Study, 
                                                           
5 In Finland the sample is representative of the 18-74 years old population. See 
http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/ for detailed information. 
6  See http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators and 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/index.aspx for additional information. 
7 See http://www.oecd.org/health/health-systems/oecdhealthdata2012.htm for additional information. 
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the Transmonee data by UNICEF/ICDC, Central Statistical Offices and research studies 
are the main sources of the WIID. The WIID database, which collects information on 
income inequality for developed, developing and transition countries, currently offers the 
widest time series data coverage at the country level. In the empirical analysis, we rely on 
the WIID data for measuring the GINI coefficient from the second half of the seventies 
until 1998 while for the recent period we have used data from the European Statistical 
Office, EUROSTAT.  
 
2.2 Income inequality 
2.2.1 Measurement issues 
 
The WIID dataset reports two measures of the Gini coefficient. The first measure is 
calculated using methods developed by Shorrocks and Wan (2008) and consists in 
derivating the Gini coefficient using data on income deciles while the second measure is 
the one originally reported by the source. The high correlation of 0.99 between the two 
GINI coefficients suggests that both measures are substitutable. In the present analysis 
we rely on the first measure since it has a better coverage both in terms of countries and 
time periods. 
The WIID data also reports several versions of the Gini index for the same country-year 
pair, depending on the coverage of the surveys underlying the observations, the income 
reference unit, the equivalence scale, or the income definition employed. More than 90% 
of the surveys used for computing the Gini coefficient use samples of the whole 
population while the 10% remaining are based on sub samples of the population (e.g. 
workers). The reference unit is either the household (85% of cases) or the individual (15% 
of cases). While the population coverage of the surveys and the reference unit do not 
seem to pose particular problems, the income concept and the equivalence scale, on the 
other hand, have a substantial impact on the Gini measure. In particular, the Gini index 
varies according to the following income definitions: disposable income, monetary 
disposable income, gross income, monetary gross income, net and gross earnings, 
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consumption and expenditure.8 In addition, when the reference unit is the household, the 
income measure can be adjusted or not adjusted (i.e. not equivalised) to take into account 
the difference in relative need of households of varying sizes. When adjusted, the 
following equivalence scales can be used: the household size, the square root of the 
household size, the OECD scale, the OECD-modified scale and for some countries a 
specific national scale is applied (e.g. the UK uses the HBAI scale produced by the 
Department for Work and Pensions). Unfortunately it is not possible to use a general 
routine to sort the data, since the presence of missing values prevents us from choosing 
an income definition (or equivalence scale), which would provide us with comparable 
figures between and/or within country.  
In order to have one data entry for every country-year observation, we had to select one 
observation for those cases of multiple entries. We have applied a “pragmatic” algorithm, 
which works as follows: we first select observations computed on disposable income; if 
this information is not available we thus choose Gini coefficients based on either 
monetary disposable income or gross income, otherwise we takes the Gini measures 
calculated on earnings. As a result, we end up with a sample wherein 83% of the 
observations are computed by using disposable income, 5% gross income, 2% monetary 
disposable income, 6% gross earning and 4 % by using different income definitions. As 
for the equivalence scale, the method aims, as far as possible, at selecting country 
observations that make use of the same equivalence scale for the computation of the Gini 
over the different periods.  
All data on income inequality for the post-1996 taken from EUROSTAT are equivalised 
using the OECD-modified scale. This implies that the 2 data points per country 
corresponding to the two EVS waves having taken place after 1996, are based on the 
same equivalence scale. In the previous period (i.e. the first two income inequality 
measures linked to the first 2 EVS waves), data are less consistent: 35 % of the GINI 
measures are equivalised by dividing the household income by the number of 
household’s member, 40% of the observations come with no adjustment and 25% use a 
                                                           
8 For more detailed information about the income concept, see UNU-WIDER (2013). 
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national scale. The two income inequality measures per country corresponding to the two 
EVS waves having taken place before 1993 have been selected in such a way as to 
maximize the likelihood for a given country to have income inequality data based on the 
same equivalence scale over these 2 periods. We are however aware that using inequality 
values, which have been calculated by using different equivalence scales, might render 
country comparisons problematic. However, as suggested by the sensitivity analysis 
reported in Burniaux et al. (1998), while the level and, in particular, the composition of 
income inequality are affected by the use of different equivalence scales, trends over time 
and rankings across countries are much less affected. Furthermore, we have included in 
the empirical analysis        dummies in order to specifically control for shifts in 
equivalence scales and income. In this way, we should purge the Gini coefficients of the 
variation created by these changes in its measurements. 
 
2.3 Descriptive analysis 
 
Before embarking on the analysis of the impact of income inequality on the three social 
outcomes, i.e. health, social capital and happiness, we present some descriptive analysis 
of our measure of income inequality, i.e. the Gini coefficient. In particular, we will assess 
the variability of the Gini along two dimensions: (1) over the EU member states and (2) 
over time.  
Figure 2.1 displays the country average Gini coefficient for 26 European member states 
over the period 1981-2009. There exists a substantial variation across countries, with 
Slovak Republic exhibiting the lowest levels of income inequality and Portugal 
displaying the highest levels. Nordic countries as Sweden and Finland, which have 
traditionally a more generous welfare system, hold the top positions, i.e. they are more 
equal, with an average value of the Gini equal respectively to 22 and 23. Mediterranean 
countries along with some Eastern countries rank very lowly, with Gini values ranging 
between 30 and 35.  
Table 2 depicts the evolution of the Gini coefficient over the 4 periods covered by the 
EVS. In the first two periods covered by the EVS we observe a rise in income inequality 
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in Germany and the Netherlands. The United Kingdom is also characterized by a marked 
surge in the value of the Gini coefficient. On contrary, France or Italy show a reduction 
in the level of income disparities in the 80s  
Figure 2.1: Country average Gini coefficient over the period 1981-2009 (0-100)
 
Source: World Income Inequality Database and European Statistical Office, EUROSTAT 
Table 2: Evolution over time of the Gini coefficient 
Country 1981-1984 1990-1993 1999-2001 2008-2010 
Austria . 22.70d 26.00 26.20 
Belgium 28.20b 23.40e 29.00 26.40 
Bulgaria . 23.30f 34.35g 35.90 
Cyprus . . . 28.30 
Czech Republic  22.20 22.63g 24.70 
Denmark 41.27c 30.70f 21.00 25.10 
Estonia . 24.00 33.98g 30.90 
Finland . 20.40f 24.00 25.90 
France 31.40 28.00 29.00 29.80 
Germany 28.00 29.30f 25.00 30.20 
Greece . . 34.00 33.40 
Hungary . 20.32 24.49g 25.20 
Ireland 36.60c 36.00d 32.00 29.90 
Italy 33.00 32.20f 30.00 31.50 
Latvia . 24.00 33.60g 37.70 
Lithuania . 24.80 32.26g 34.00 
Luxembourg . . 27.00 27.70 
Netherlands 28.10a 29.60f 26.00 27.60 
Poland . 26.80f 33.99g 32.00 
Portugal . 32.90 36.00 35.80 
Romania . 26.20 30.16g 36.00 
Slovak Republic  18.00 23.22g 23.70 
Slovenia . 25.90 24.52g 23.40 
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Portugal
Greece
Ireland
Latvia
Italy
Bulgaria
Poland
United Kingdom
Romania
Lithuania
Estonia
France
Denmark
Spain
Cyprus
Germany
Netherlands
Luxembourg
Belgium
Austria
Slovenia
Finland
Hungary
Czech Republic
Sweden
Slovak Republic
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Spain 26.90c 26.80f 33.00 31.30 
Sweden 19.40 . 22.00 24.80 
United Kingdom 25.70 33.50 32.00 32.40 
Source: World Income Inequality Database and European Statistical Office, EUROSTAT. 
Note:a 1977; b 1979; c 1980; d 1987; e 1988; f 1989; g 1997. 
 
A less clear pattern emerges for the period going from 1999 to 2010. For two third of the 
countries, the Gini index displays an increasing time trend, while the opposite occurs for 
the remaining countries with Latvia and Romania recording the largest increases in 
inequality. 
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3. The impact of income inequality on social capital 
3.1. The rationale 
The term social capital is often traced back to the work of the sociologist Bourdieu 
(1977), but it gained popularity with the seminal work of Coleman (1990) and Putnam 
(1993). Recently, Guiso et al. (2008) define social capital as “good” culture—i.e., a set of 
beliefs and values that facilitate cooperation among the members. The authors show that 
social capital can be measured by both direct indicators (such as generalized trust) and 
indirect indicators (such as membership or blood donations).  
There is a large consensus that heterogeneity is one important factor reducing the 
formation of social capital. Usually, community heterogeneity refers to income inequality 
but also ethnicity, and racial heterogeneity, though here, our interest is more specifically 
on economic inequality. Several mechanisms could explain the association between 
economic inequality and social capital. First, individuals might be adverse to 
heterogeneity. In other words, they prefer having contacts with individuals that are 
similar to themselves, i.e. that belong to the same socioeconomic group. In heterogeneous 
societies contacts between dissimilar individuals will be at a lower rate than in more 
homogeneous societies. Repeated interactions being conducive of social capital and trust, 
heterogeneous societies are thus characterized by fewer contacts and, in consequence, by 
lower levels of cooperation and trust (see the seminal works by Colman, 1990, and 
Alesina et al, 2002 for instance). This aversion to heterogeneity can be driven by the fact 
that individuals from different socioeconomic groups are less likely to share common 
values and norms which makes it more difficult for them to predict the attitudes of others. 
This creates an environment not favorable to the development of social capital (Knack 
and Keefer, 1997). Second, when resources are not evenly distributed, poor individuals 
might perceive that they are living in an unfair society where the rich tend to exploit the 
poor. This would lead low-income individuals to develop distrust against richer 
individuals (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005). Uslaner and Brown (2005) argue that when 
income inequality is high, individuals from different socioeconomic groups would have 
the sensation that they are not sharing the same fate, and this would hamper trust. Third, 
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inequality should relate to the level of optimism. A higher level of inequality is likely to 
reduce the level of optimism for the future and thereby trust (Uslaner and Brown, 2005, 
Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005).  
 
3.2. Existing empirical evidence 
Empirical studies on the relationship between heterogeneity and the level of social capital 
are of three types. Cross-country papers explore either the association at the aggregated 
level between income inequality and social capital or combine individual-level data on 
social capital with country-level information on economic inequality. Studies on single 
countries pool information on income inequality at the subnational level with individual 
level information on social capital. 
 
3.2.1 Cross-country studies  
Most of the cross-country studies conclude that when income inequality is high, social 
capital tends to be stunted (Knack and Keefer, 1997, Leigh, 2006a, Fisher and Torgler, 
2006, Berggren and Jordhal, 2007, Bjornskov, 2006).   
Based on aggregated country-level data drawn from the World Values Surveys, cross-
country estimates reported in Knack and Keefer (1997) show that income inequality is 
negatively and significantly related to trust and civic cooperation. The empirical analysis 
is based on 29 market countries, and several country-level controls are included in the 
estimates. 
Contrary to the studies mentioned above, Leigh (2006a) explores the relationship 
between social capital and income inequality by combining individual data drawn from 
the World Values Surveys in 59 countries with country measure of income dispersion. 
The author finds that both income inequality and ethnic heterogeneity are negatively 
associated with trust but that the effect of the former dominates the latter’s one. The 
results hold even after taking into account the reciprocal relationship between income 
17 
inequality and social capital. 9  Using also the World Value Surveys, cross-country 
estimates in Berggren and Jordhal (2006) confirm these findings. Fisher and Torgler 
(2006) also working with individual data on trust for 25 countries observe that trust is 
positively associated with a person's relative income position as measured by the 
difference between a respondent’s income and the national (or regional) income. 
While all the papers mentioned above find a strong negative association between social 
capital and economic inequality, Steijn and Lancee (2011), on the contrary, conclude that 
income inequality and perceived inequality do not correlate with trust once country 
wealth is controlled for. Additionally, Lancee and Van de Werfhorst (2011) examine the 
effect of income inequality in EU countries on various forms of social capital capturing 
social, civic and cultural participation. The empirical work is based on the 2006 EU-
SILC survey and demonstrates that though civic participation is significantly associated 
with economic inequality social and cultural participation are not. 
 
3.2.2 Single-country studies 
Research based on a single country generally relies on a multilevel approach. Social 
capital is measured at the individual level and explained by both individual 
socioeconomic characteristics (age, educational attainment, income, gender, etc) and the 
social context in which the respondents are living (in particular, the level of community 
heterogeneity). This social context is defined at the municipal/neighborhood level 
(Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000, 2002, Leigh, 2006a, Costas and Kahn, 2003, Coffe and 
Geys, 2006, Gustavsson and Jordhal, 2008).  
A significant literature has documented the negative effect of community heterogeneity 
on social capital across metropolitan areas in the US. Alesina and La Ferrara (2000 and 
2002) use cross-sectional data from the US General Social Surveys over the period 1974-
1994 to examine the effect of community heterogeneity on membership and trust. After 
                                                           
9
 To account for the reciprocal relationship between income inequality and social capital, the author 
instruments income inequality with the ratio of the size of the cohort aged between 40 and 59 to the 
population aged 15 to 69. 
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having controlled for individual and some community characteristics as well as for year 
and state-fixed effects, the authors find that respondents living in more racially 
fragmented and income unequal communities report lower levels of social capital. 
However, the effect of racial heterogeneity is even stronger and income inequality has no 
longer a significant effect on trust when this variable is added to the empirical model. 
Costas and Kahn (2003) also observe a negative impact of community heterogeneity on 
various measures of social capital (volunteering and membership in organizations), once 
they control for individual characteristics as well as for time and regional dummies. 
However, in contrast to Alesina and La Ferrara (2000 and 2002) their results suggest that 
the crucial determinant of volunteering and membership in organizations is income 
inequality.10,11 Tesei (2011), using the decomposability of the Theil index, shows that 
what really matters is income inequality between racial groups. While racial 
fragmentation and economic inequality are both significantly associated with trust and 
group participation, these effects become insignificant when income inequality between 
racial groups is accounted for. 
Solid empirical evidence on the relationship between social capital and income inequality 
outside the US are quite limited. Leigh (2006b) analyzes the determinants of localized 
trust (trusting those living in the same neighborhoods) and generalized trust (trusting 
those who live in the same country) in Australia using individual data over the period 
1997-1998 combined with information on the neighborhood in which the respondents are 
living. Results suggest that there is not an apparent relationship between inequality and 
trust and this finding remains identical when the author accounts for the possible 
“endogeneity” of income inequality. Coffe and Geys (2006) explore the effect of income 
inequality on the municipality level of social capital in 307 Flemish municipalities in 
2000. The authors rely on three indicators measuring social capital in a broad sense: 
associational life, electoral participation and crime rate that are combined into a single 
index using a principal component analysis. After having controlled for several 
                                                           
10
 Costas and Kahn (2003) also find that the increase in the participation of women on the labour market is 
the main responsible for the decline in social capital produced inside home (entertaining friends and 
relatives). 
11
 Note that when the authors correct for the endogeneity of income inequality in the volunteering equation, 
the coefficients associated with income inequality becomes insignificant. 
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socioeconomic characteristics of the municipality, the authors do not observe any effect 
of income inequality on social capital. On contrary, ethnic heterogeneity has a depressing 
effect on social capital.  
Finally, Gustavsson and Jordhal (2008) combine Swedish individual-level panel data 
(1994-1998) on trust with county level measures of inequality. The results suggest that 
different measures of income inequality lead to different conclusions. The Gini 
coefficient is weakly related to trust while the ratio of the 50th over the 10th percentile 
income displays a negative and significant association with trust suggesting that 
differences in the bottom half of the income distribution matter most for explaining trust. 
Compared to Alesina and La Ferrara (2000, 2002), Leigh (2006b) or Costas and Kahn 
(2003), the panel data employed in this study allows for controlling for time-invariant 
individual and county characteristics in addition to the conventional time-varying 
individual covariates, implying that the estimated association between social capital and 
income inequality is very likely to be a causal one. 
In conclusion, macro studies usually conclude that income inequality depresses social 
capital while micro studies seem to produce more contrasted results (see Table 4.1 for an 
overview of the studies). However macro studies are sometimes problematic when it 
comes to making causal statements. Indeed, this body of literature is mainly grounded on 
cross-sectional data (i.e., one point per country), meaning that it is not possible to control 
for all potential time-invariant country specific-effects (and thus to look at the effect, 
within a country, of income inequality changes on social capital formation). Single 
country based studies have the main advantage of keeping constant country-specific 
determinants of trust which are susceptible to bias cross-country estimates if they are not 
controlled for.12 Micro studies produce more contrasted results than macro analyses. In 
the USA, there seems to be a robust negative association between community 
heterogeneity and social capital. Findings for other countries are less conclusive. 
                                                           
12
 Furthermore, while income inequality measures used for cross-comparisons are subject to measurement 
comparability issues, this is less the case when one relies on income inequality measures of different 
geographical units within a given country. 
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While the empirical analysis presented in this chapter examines the relationship between 
income inequality and social capital in a cross-country context, contrary to the 
aforementioned macro studies, a longer time period (1981-2008) is covered and the time-
invariant country heterogeneity is accounted for. 
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Table 3.1: Studies on income inequality and social capital 
Author Data Inequality measure (INE) 
Main outcome (O) 
Method Results 
Alesina and La 
Ferrara 
(2002) 
USA 
1974-1994 
INE : Gini measured at the local level 
(metropolitan areas) 
O: Trust 
Control for individual and communities character plus 
state and year dummies 
DFbeta method to control for outliers 
Respondents living in more fragmented and income unequal 
communities report lower level of trust 
Effect of income inequality no longer significant when racial 
heterogeneity is controlled for 
Alesina and La 
Ferrara, (2000) 
USA 
1974-1994 
INE: Gini measured at the local level 
(metropolitan areas) 
O: Membership rate 
Inclusion of  individual and community covariates plus 
state and time dummies 
DFbetas method-IV estimates 
People living in more unequal communities are less likely to join 
groups, even after controlling for racial fragmentation 
Knack and 
Keefer (1997) 
Cross-country 
1981and 1990/1991 
29 market economies  
INE :Gini coefficient 
O: Trust and civic cooperation 
Cross country estimates (one point in time), including 
country covariates 
 
Trust and civic norms are stronger in nations with higher and more 
equal incomes 
Gustavsson 
and Jordahl 
(2008) 
Sweden, 1994-1998 
 
INE : Gini, 90/10, 90/50, 50/10 ratios 
O: Trust 
Individual data in panel combined with 
county specific information  
 
Controls include county and individual fixed effects, 
time dummies and time-varying individual covariates 
OLS and IV estimates 
 
Gini coefficient weakly related to trust while the ratio p50-10 is 
negatively and significantly related to trust.  
Differences in the bottom half in the income distribution matter for 
trust. The effect of income inequality is primarily observed for 
people with a strong aversion against income inequality 
Leigh, (2006 a) Cross-country: 59 countries 
 (1999/2000 and 1995/1997) 
INE :Gini  
O: Trust 
OLS Estimates at the (i) country level and (ii) individual 
level 
IV estimates with inequality instrumented by the relative 
size of a country’s mature age cohort 
Country income inequality is negatively and significantly 
associated with country level of trust 
Leigh, (2006 b) Australia, 1997-1998 INE: Gini  
O:“generalized” and “localized” trust 
Probit and IV estimates on individual data with income 
inequality measured at the neighbourhood-level and 
individual controls 
Income inequality at the neighborhood level is not significantly 
associated with individual trust. It is racial fragmentation that 
matters. 
Coffe and 
Geys, 2006 
Belgium, 2000 INE: Ratio of the interquartile difference in 
income (Q3-Q1) to the median income 
level  
O: (i) Electoral turnout in 2000 at municipal 
elections, (ii) density of associational 
activity, (iii) crime rate per capita. The 3 
SC indicators are combined together. 
Cross -sectional (307 municipalities) 
OSL and interval estimates  
Several control for the socioeconomic characteristics of 
the municipality 
Explanatory variables lagged one year 
Income inequality is not significantly correlated with the 
municipality’s level of social capital. 
Costa and 
Kahn (2003) 
USA, period coverage 
varying (between 1972 and 
1998) 
INE: Gini (measured at the municipal level) 
O: Social capital produced outside home: 
trust, volunteering, membership, social 
capital produced inside home: entertaining, 
Probit estimates 
Controls include individual character, survey and 
regional dummies, in addition to the variables measuring 
community heterogeneity. 
Rising community heterogeneity, and in particular income 
inequality, is negatively and significantly related to social capital 
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meeting friends IV estimates also presented for the determinants of 
volunteering 
Berggren and 
Jordhal (2006) 
Cross-country , 24 countries 
1995 or 2000  
INE: Gini 
O:Trust 
Cross -country estimates 
Include country-level covariates 
Rising income inequality is associated with lower trust  
Fischer and 
Torgler (2006) 
Cross-country, 25 countries 
1998 
INE: Relative income position 
O: Generalized trust and trust in institutions 
Cross country estimates based on individual data 
Probit estimates-Estimates include individual controls 
Trust rises with the respondent’s relative income position 
Steijn  and 
Lancee (2011) 
Cross-country 
20 Western countries, 1999 
21 European countries, 2002 
INE: Conventional gini coefficient and Gini 
coefficient of perceived inequality 
O: Trust 
Cross-country estimates, at one point in time 
Individual controls  
Multilevel logistic and linear models 
Once we control for general wealth, the effects of  actual inequality 
and perceived inequality are not significantly different from the 
zero 
Uslaner and 
Brown (2005) 
USA INE: Gini 
O: Trust, civic and political participation  
Cross-sectional estimates; state controls, time fixed 
effect 
States with higher levels of economic inequality have fewer 
trusters. None of the measures of political participation are 
significantly related to trust. 
Tesei (2011) USA,1972-2008 INE: Gini index, Theil index 
O :Trust, group membership 
Individual data combined with community measures of 
community heterogeneity 
Both racial fragmentation and income inequality are negatively 
correlated with trust.  Racial fragmentation has the strongest effect. 
The opposite is found for group membership: income inequality 
has the strongest effect 
When income inequality between racial groups is accounted for, 
income inequality and racial fragmentation become insignificant. 
Bjornskov 
(2006) 
Cross-country, 88 countries INE: Gini, O: Trust Static cross-country estimates The strongest determinant of trust is fractionalization and in 
particular income inequality 
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3.3. Empirical analysis 
3.3.1 Social capital variables 
We operationalize social capital with two indicators. The first social capital indicator captures 
the level of generalized trust reported by each respondent of the EVS. Trust constitutes a proxy 
for cognitive social capital and its use is motivated by several academic papers. In particular, 
Guiso et al. (2008 and 2010) consider that direct indicators, such as generalized trust, are 
adequate if social capital is considered as an individual belief about the willingness of other 
members of the community to cooperate.13 
In the European Value Study, respondents are asked “Generally speaking would you say that 
“most people can be trusted” or that “you can’t be too careful in dealing with people”. The 
yes/no nature of the response enable us to construct a variable trust which is equal to one if the 
respondent reports that “most people can be trusted” and equal to 0 otherwise.  
Chart 3.1: Share of the population reporting that “most people can be trusted”
 
Source: European Values Studies, Waves 1981-1984, 1990-1993, 1999-2001, 2008-2010 
                                                          
13 See Uphoff and Wijayaratna (2000) for a discussion on the distinction between structural and cognitive social 
capital. As discussed in Glaeser et al (2000), self-reported information on trust is subject to several limitations 
because the underlying question is imprecise and difficult to interpret for the respondent. Glaeser et al (2000) tackle 
this issue by examining the determinants of trust and trustworthiness in the context of an experiment based on 
Harvard undergraduates and involving monetary returns. The authors also show that individuals declaring higher 
levels of trust do not cooperate better in a trust game. Self-reported trust, on the other hand, seems to be associated 
with trustworthiness. 
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Chart 3.1 displays the country average value of the indicator. It is apparent that the level of trust 
greatly varies across countries. In Nordic countries, such as Sweden, Denmark or Finland, more 
than 60% of respondents are trustful while, on the opposite, in Cyprus, Romania, Slovak 
Republic or Portugal, less than one respondent out of 5 reports that most people can be trusted. 
Chart 3.1: Evolution over time in the share of the population reporting that most people can be 
trusted 
 
Source: European Values Studies, Waves 1981-1984, 1990-1993, 1999-2001, 2008-2010 
 
Chart 3.2 and Table 3.2 give some information on the evolution over time in the level of trust. 
Chart 3.2 shows the regression line when the country-wave specific level of trust is fitted against 
a trend.  After having partialled out for the country fixed effects, the share of people reporting 
that “most people can be trusted” has, on average, increased by only 1.42% between each wave.  
However, as it is clear with Table 3.2, this average trend hides country differences. In Sweden, 
the share of people saying that most people can be trusted increased from 57.3% in 1981 to 71.6% 
in 2009. In Slovak Republic, on the other hand, social capital has dropped from 21.8% in the first 
EVS wave to 16.9% in the last one. 
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Table 3.2: Evolution over time in the level of trust 
Country 1981-1984 1990-1993 1999-2001 2008-2010 
Austria . 32.53 34.20 38.06 
Belgium 30.45 33.21 30.27 34.85 
Bulgaria . 30.40 27.04 18.84 
Cyprus . . . 9.023 
Czech Rep 26.20 25.47 30.86 27.51 
Denmark 53.79 59.17 68.10 77.84 
Estonia . 27.41 23.42 32.50 
Finland . 62.69 57.14 64.06 
France 25.44 23.11 21.13 27.58 
Germany 32.46 33.50 38.56 38.79 
UK 43.17 43.31 28.83 40.52 
Greece . . 23.96 22.88 
Hungary . 25.31 22.36 21.74 
Iceland 39.59 43.80 41.36 52.89 
Ireland 41.24 47.66 36.90 37.25 
Italy 27.45 35.82 33.19 31.31 
Latvia . 18.84 17.70 25.80 
Lithuania . 31.48 25.88 31.12 
Luxembourg . . 25.34 31.00 
Malta 10.20 26.25 20.34 21.45 
Netherlands 45.05 55.09 62.78 63.51 
Poland . 29.43 18.94 28.89 
Portugal . 21.71 13.03 16.96 
Romania . 15.92 9.901 17.63 
Slovak 21.74 16.39 12.47 16.87 
Slovenia . 17.33 21.93 25.69 
Spain 35.41 35.82 38.99 35.60 
Sweden 57.30 66.13 66.92 71.65 
Source: European Values Studies, Waves 1981-1984, 1990-1993, 1999-2001, 2008-2010 
 
The second indicator of social capital captures the importance of associational activity in each 
EU Member State. It takes the value one if the respondent reports to belong to one of the 
following organizations: human rights, conservation, the environment, ecology, animal rights, to 
youth work, sports or recreation, women's group, peace movement or organizations concerned 
with health and equal to zero otherwise. Following Knack and Keefer (1997) or Rupasingha et al. 
(2006), we focus on ''Putnamesque'' networks involving ''horizontal egalitarian relationship'' 
rather than on networks based on “vertical hierarchical relationships''. 14  We also check the 
robustness of our findings using an alternative measure of associational activity, i.e. the number 
of the “Putnesmesque” organizations to which each respondent belongs to. 
                                                           
14 In contrast to Putnamesque groups, which are thought to play a positive role in the society, the impact of Olsonian groups  
such as political parties and movements, trade unions, professional associations, and various interest groups, may be negative if 
these groups engage in collective actions in their favor and at the expense of the rest of the society. 
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Though being member of an organization might be desirable per se, it does not convey 
automatically the benefits expected from social capital as the actual advantages depend on the 
type of relationship within the organization. The data we are using do not allow making such a 
distinction.  
However, participation in associational activities has been largely used in the literature either in 
this form or in a closely related formulation and is intended to measure “structural'' social capital, 
i.e. social networks that entails mutual beneficial actions. Participation in specific organizations 
reduces the “social distance” between individuals and should promote trust and cooperation 
(Glaeser et al, 2000). Furthermore, in societies with high income inequality, individuals 
belonging to the lower end of the income distribution are expected to report lower participation 
for income or distress-related feeling reasons (Lancee and Van de Werfhorst, 2011).  
Chart 3.3: Share of the population belonging to a “Putnamesque” organization 
 
Source: European Values Studies, Waves 1981-1984, 1990-1993, 1999-2001, 2008-2010 
 
Chart 3.3 displays the country average value of the indicator. Countries, such as Sweden, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Denmark report the highest figures whilst Eastern European 
countries such as Romania, Bulgaria or Poland display low levels of participation. In Denmark 
and Luxembourg, more than 40% of interviewed individuals are members of one of the 
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organizations described above. Conversely, in Poland and Romania this indicator scores below 
10%.  
Participation in horizontal association has substantially increased over time, by an amount 
equivalent to 5.3% between each wave (see Chart 4.4). Table 4.3 shows that in France and Italy, 
the participation in “Putnamesque” organizations has almost quadrupled and quintupled over the 
last 30 years. The value of the indicator has evolved much more slowly in Eastern European 
countries. 
Chart 3.4: Evolution over time in the share of the population belonging to horizontal associations 
 
Source: European Values Studies, Waves 1981-1984, 1990-1993, 1999-2001, 2008-2010 
 
In general, the two indicators of social capital show that Nordic countries display high level of 
social capital while Eastern and Southern countries exhibit lower levels of social capital. As 
shown in Chart 3.5, the correlation between the two indicators is above 0.6 and significantly 
different from zero. 
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Chart 3.5: Correlation between the two social capital variables 
 
Source: European Values Studies, Waves 1981-1984, 1990-1993, 1999-2001, 2008-2010 
Table 3.3: Evolution over time in the share of the population participating in “Putnamesque” 
organizations 
Country 1981-1984 1990-1993 1999-2001 2008-2010 
Austria . 25.19 37.62 25.68 
Belgium 9.316 34.11 42.36 46.92 
Bulgaria . 8 8.486 7.932 
Cyprus . . . 10.32 
Czech Rep 29.38 36.93 28.12 31.48 
Denmark 15.27 44.08 49.35 57.33 
Estonia . 18.72 14.29 23.66 
Finland . 34.34 39.52 31.71 
France 7.825 20.74 23.55 26.64 
Germany 8.074 40.01 30.27 27.91 
UK 12.67 26.42 11.74 26.83 
Greece . . 31.41 12.41 
Hungary . 9.756 7.865 9.475 
Iceland 26.26 43.76 44.95 48.46 
Ireland 12.22 34.18 37.79 23.52 
Italy 3.852 16.78 20.66 21.29 
Latvia . 12.79 9.330 12.26 
Lithuania . 14.43 6.660 13.65 
Luxembourg . . 42.11 48.20 
Malta 7.075 8.955 15.02 5.186 
Netherlands 17.90 57.62 76.18 72.35 
Poland . 12.31 7.187 6.468 
Portugal . 15.41 15.19 8.904 
Romania . 3.905 4.642 7.831 
Slovak 20.52 33.44 12.53 22.17 
Slovenia . 10.55 23.04 30.87 
Spain 4.720 8.244 16.96 10.11 
Sweden 9.111 39.57 51.67 30.73 
Source: European Values Studies, Waves 1981-1984, 1990-1993, 1999-2001, 2008-2010 
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3.3.2. Operationalization of the empirical study 
We estimate the effect of income inequality on the trust and on membership by using individual 
and country-level data in order to account simultaneously for both the compositional and 
contextual determinants of self-reported social capital. The empirical specification to be 
estimated is defined as follow: 
      =   +                 +	      +        +    +   +    + 	      (3.1) 
where      is the self-reported measure of social capital for individual i residing in country c, at 
time t. As a measure of inequality, we employ the Gini coefficient, drawn from the World 
Income Inequality Database (see chapter 2 for additional information). 15        is a set of 
individual and household specific explanatory variables while        represents 2-year lag 
country level variables and   	and    are respectively a linear time trend and country dummies. 
    are the break dummies to account for the measurement issues in the Gini coefficient. 	     is 
the idiosyncratic error for individual i at time t residing in country c.  
               , corresponds to the GINI measure 2 years before the EVS survey takes place in 
a given country. Given that the EVS has 4 different waves, this implies that for each country, we 
cover between 1 and 4 different periods, spanning from the beginning of the 80s until 2010, 
according to the number of EVS waves to which the country participated (see table 2.1). 
Glaeser et al. (2000 and 2002) show that social capital differences across individuals cannot be 
well explained by just group-level variables. Individual heterogeneity should also be taken into 
account.      is meant to control for this individual heterogeneity. In particular, according to life 
cycle theory, investment in social capital is expected to increase and then decrease with age. This 
non-linear relationship is well documented in the literature (Rupasingha et al., 2006, Glaeser et 
al., 2000). Similarly, education is in all empirical studies found positively associated with social 
capital (Putman, 19995, Glaeser et al., 2002). Employment status, family status and gender are 
also important determinants of social capital investment. As a result, we include in equation (3.1) 
                                                           
15
 Note that Steijn and Lancee (2011) also examine the relationship between the perception of income inequality and 
trust with perception of income inequality measured using information drawn from the 1999 wave of the 
International Social Survey Program (ISSP). In this survey respondents were asked to estimate the actual income of 
different occupations. Steijn and Lancee (2011) use this information to derive a GINI-coefficient of perceived 
income inequality. 
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the following individual covariates: age (age and age squared), gender and educational level of 
the respondents as well as labor status and income dummies (unemployed, retired, high and low  
Table 3.4 Description of Variables and Summary Statistics 
 Description Source  
Outcome  Variables  
Trust  Variable equal to one if the respondent replies that “most people 
can be trusted“, 0 otherwise 
EVS 
Membership Variable equal to one if the respondent report to belong to one of 
the following organizations: human rights, conservation, the 
environment, ecology, animal rights, to youth work, sports or 
recreation, women's group, peace movement or organizations 
concerned with health, 0 otherwise 
EVS 
Membership bis Variable measuring the number of  the following organizations 
to which the respondent reports to belong to: human rights, 
conservation, the environment, ecology, animal rights, to youth 
work, sports or recreation, women's group, peace movement or 
organizations concerned with health 
EVS 
Country level variables 
GINI Gini coefficient (see chapter 2)  WIID/EUROSTAT 
Log GDP per capita Logarithm of the per capita gross domestic product in 2005 
dollars 
WEO 
Unemployment rate Percentage of labor force unemployed WEO 
Individual level variables 
Male Variable equal to one if respondent is male, 0 if female EVS 
Age Age of the respondent EVS  
Age squared Age squared of the respondent EVS 
Unemployed Variable equal to one if the respondent is unemployed, 0 
otherwise  
EVS 
Self-Employed Variable equal to one if the respondent is self-employed, 0 
otherwise 
EVS 
Retired Variable equal to one if the respondent is retired, 0 otherwise EVS 
Married/Cohabiting Variable equal to one if the respondents is married or cohabits 
with someone at the moment of the interview 
EVS 
Education completion 
age: 15-18 
Variable equal to one if the respondent completed education 
when he was aged between 15 and 18 years old 
EVS 
Education completion 
age: above 19 years old 
Variable equal to one if the respondent completed education 
when he was 19 years old or more,  
EVS 
Childless dummy Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent has children, 0 
otherwise  
EVS 
Low income  Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent declares to have 
a low income, 0 otherwise 
EVS 
High income  Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent declares to have 
a high income, 0 otherwise 
EVS 
Religious Variable equal to one if the respondent is a religious person, 0 
otherwise. 
EVS 
Note: A time trend as well as break dummies are included in all estimates. 
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income).16 In line with Glaeser et al. (2000 and 2002), we also consider a religious dummy as an 
additional covariate, which is equal to 1 if the respondent reports to be religious and equal to 0 
otherwise. Finally, we include household related information such as the marital status and the 
number of children. A precise definition of each covariate entering in equation (1) is presented in 
Table 3.4. Correlations between individual level variables and country level variables used for 
the trust and membership empirical models are displayed in Tables A.6-7 and Tables A.8-9 in 
Appendix. 
  	is the estimated coefficient of interest which informs us on the association between income 
inequality and social capital. Several statistical issues might plague our results, i.e. bias   	. More 
specifically,   	might be (1) capturing the effect other country specificities simultaneously 
correlated with income inequality and the social outcome under consideration (“omitted variable” 
bias) and/or (ii) the results of a reverse causality. To deal with the omitted variable issues, 
country dummies   	are added in equation (1). This implies that we control for all country-time 
invariant effects. The possibility to add country fixed effects is the major advantage of the 
present analysis, compared to other macro studies on the same topic. This is possible given that 
we measure income inequality and all the variables in equation (1) across different periods.17  
Several papers have shown that social capital promotes economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 
1997) or judicial efficiency (La Porta, 1997), causation running the other way, i.e. from social 
capital to income inequality, could still be a serious concern of the present investigation. This 
reverse causality issue is partially taken into account by including the Gini coefficient in 
equation (1) with a two years lag.18  
W     variables are meant to capture the effect of country time variant determinants of social 
capital. As these variables are potentially associated with both income inequality and social 
capital, failing to include them in equation (3.1) would imply that the coefficient associated with 
                                                           
16 Also homeownership (DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999) is found to contribute substantially to social capital. Owners 
of houses might have additional motivations to participate to the associational activities in the area of residence and 
might be more integrated and thus more trustful. Unfortunately information on ownership is only available for the 
first wave of the EVS so that we have been unable to include it as additional covariate. 
17 Note however, that if there are time variant country variables that are omitted, the coefficient associated with 
income inequality will be biased.      	partially deal with this problem. 
18 Note however that to properly tackle the reverse causality problem, we would need to find out a suitable 
instrumental variable for the Gini coefficient. It is not clear at this stage which variable could constitute a good 
instrumental variable. 
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income inequality would capture not only the effect of income inequality but also the influence 
of those additional variables on social capital. We thus include the two following 
macroeconomic covariates: the unemployment rate and the logarithm of GDP per capita, in 2005 
US dollars at purchasing power parity. These figures are both drawn from the WEO dataset 
provided by the IMF. 
Note that ethnic, religious or linguistic heterogeneities have often been cited as factors of social 
tensions (Putman, 1995, Leigh, 2006a, Rupasingha et al., 2006, Alesina and la Ferrara, 2000 and 
2002) with detrimental effects on social capital accumulation, and trust in particular. Several 
papers discuss the relative importance of income inequality versus ethnic heterogeneity on social 
capital (Leigh, 2006a, Alesina and La Ferrara, 200 and 2002, Costas and Kahn, 2003), without 
reaching a definite conclusion. Moreover, the most commonly used proxy for ethnic diversity, 
the ethnic fractionalization index proposed by Alesina et al (2003), only covers one year per 
country and as such is inadequate for the present analysis. However, we are still able to allow for 
time-invariant ethnic heterogeneity thanks to the inclusion of the country fixed effects in 
equation (3.1). 
Because recent analyses demonstrate that the presence of pervasive serial correlation in country 
level fixed effect models and the use of group-level variables may produce severely downward-
biased standard errors (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2001; Donald and Lang 2001), we 
employ Huber-White standard errors clustered at the country level throughout the estimations. 
These standard errors are robust to arbitrary forms of error correlation within a country. Since to 
the authors’ knowledge most empirical papers have neglected this issue so far, therefore this 
“correction” is one of the major advantages of the present analysis. 
 
3.3.3 Econometric results 
Table 3.5 presents the estimated coefficients of the model (3.1). Model of column 1 includes the 
Gini coefficient, a linear trend as well as country and break dummies. Because of the country 
fixed effects, the coefficient associated with income inequality is identified only through within 
country variations. In column 2, we include individual level variables while in column 3, we also 
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control for the 2 time-varying macroeconomic variables. Linear models are used for estimating 
equation (4.1) and the t-statistics reported in brackets are clustered at the country level.  
 
Trust and income inequality 
Results reported in the first column of Table 3.5 show that income inequality is not related to 
trust when no individual and macroeconomics covariates are included in equation (3.1). However, 
when we control for the individual characteristics, the coefficient associated with the Gini index 
becomes significantly different from zero and the negative sign suggests that people are more 
trustful in countries with low levels of income disparity. Adding country time-variant variables 
(column 3) makes the estimate of the relationship between income inequality and trust even more 
precise. This result is opposite to Stein and Lancee (2011). Indeed, the authors conclude that 
income inequality is no longer related to trust when wealth differences across countries are taken 
into account. However, Stein and Lancee (2011) do not include country fixed effects given that 
their data are cross-sectional. We thus think that their findings are less robust than those 
presented here.  
The magnitude of the coefficient associated to the Gini coefficient doubles when we include time 
country variables, moving from -0.004 in column 2 to -0.008 in column 3. Based on the latter, it 
means that if the Gini coefficient in Romania drops to the Swedish level, i.e. from 36 to 25 (2008 
levels), the average value of the trust indicator will increase in Romania by almost 54%19. 
Analogously, if the value of the Gini coefficient decreases by one standard deviation (4.32), then 
the average value of trust in the sample will rise by 10%. 
Results reported in the last 4 columns of Table 3.5 suggest that the relationship between trust and 
income inequality is robust to alternative specifications. In columns 4 and 5, we have estimated 
equation (3.1) using different lag structures of the Gini coefficient. In particular, in columns 4 
and 5, we assume that income inequality affects trust, with respectively no lag and one year lag. 
In column 6, we use a three year moving average centered on year t-2 to smooth out some of the 
noise associated with the construction of the Gini indices. For consistency purposes, we have 
used the corresponding lags for the two other country level variables, the logarithm of GDP per 
                                                           
19 [(36-35)*0.008]/0.16, with 0.16 being the average value of trust in Romania in 2008. 
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capita and the unemployment rate. Results reported in columns 4-6 show that irrespective of the 
lag structure employed, the Gini coefficient remains negative and statistically different from zero. 
Finally, in the last column of Table 4.5, we have re-estimated equation (3.1) using a probit model 
to account for potential nonlinearity in the function linking the explanatory and dependent 
variables. We report the marginal effect at the average value of the explanatory variables. Results 
are identical to those displayed in columns 3. Trust is negatively and significantly associated 
with income inequality with the point estimate of the marginal effect of income inequality being 
equal to -0.008. 
 
Trust and the other covariates 
Results for the other covariates are mostly in line with the exiting literature. The comments 
below are based on the specification displayed in column 3. Education, employment status, and 
income are significantly associated with generalized trust. In particular, education seems to be a 
key determinant of trust. Individuals reporting to have completed education when they were 19 
years old or older (a proxy for a tertiary education level) display trust levels that are on average 
15% higher than respondents having completed education before reaching 15 (reference 
category). Similarly, individuals having completed education between 15 and 18 years are about 
6% more trustful than the reference category (i.e., having not completed education). 
Unemployment is also a source of lower trust .Additionally, individuals with a low (high) 
income display trust levels inferior (superior) with respect to the respondents with a medium 
income. Age is positively associated with trust, though trust is not following an inverted U shape 
over the life cycle. Interestingly, childless individuals tend to be more trustful than those having 
children. Contrary to what has been observed in Alesina et al. (2002), in Europe women do not 
prove to be less trusting than men. Additionally, religious individuals do not display higher 
levels of trust than atheist or not religious respondents.  
The two country level variables, GDP per capita and unemployment rate, are not significantly 
different from zero. While this might seem surprising at first glance, two comments are worth 
making. First, country fixed effects have been included in all specifications. This implies that the 
vector of coefficient   identifies the effect of the variation over time, within country, of both 
macroeconomic variables. As a matter of fact, if the country dummies are not included in 
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equation (3.1), the GDP per capita is positively and significantly associated with trust while the 
Gini coefficient still shows a negative correlation with trust. 20  Second, we control at the 
individual level for the unemployment status and the income level and these two variables are 
strongly related to self-reported trust. In other words, the two country level variables only 
measure the effect on trust of living in a society with a low/high GDP per capita and 
unemployment rate once the personal situation of the respondent has been accounted for (Di 
Tella and MacCulloch, 2001). Our results suggest that what matter is more the individual 
situation in terms of income and job status than the aggregated effect at the national level.  
  
                                                           
20 Results are not reported in table 3.5 but are available upon request. 
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Table 3.5: Impact of income inequality on trust 
Main specifications 
(columns 1-3) 
 
Robustness checks 
(columns 4-7) 
 
                           Lags of country-level variables 
 2-year 2-year 2-year 
 
 
No lag 1-year 
3 years 
moving 
average 2-year 
       Probit 
Gini coefficient -0.003 -0.004* -0.008** -0.007** -0.006* -0.008** -0.008*** 
(-1.68) (-2.06) (-2.55) (-2.07) (-2.00) (-2.70) (-2.61) 
Age 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004** 
(2.04) (2.03) (2.03) (2.05) (2.05) (1.97) 
Age squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(-1.07) (-1.07) (-1.06) (-1.08) (-1.09) (-0.98) 
Education completion age: 
15-18 years 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.067*** 
(6.71) (6.78) (6.58) (6.63) (6.75) (6.43) 
Education completion age: 
above 19 years 0.148*** 0.149*** 0.148*** 0.148*** 0.149*** 0.165*** 
(9.52) (9.66) (9.47) (9.48) (9.56) (10.51) 
Retired -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.031*** 
(-2.93) (-2.96) (-2.97) (-3.05) (-2.94) (-2.97) 
Unemployed -0.051*** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.053*** -0.052*** -0.060*** 
(-4.21) (-4.20) (-4.23) (-4.30) (-4.24) (-4.61) 
Low Income -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.037*** 
(-5.41) (-5.57) (-5.64) (-5.59) (-5.61) (-5.82) 
High Income 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.057*** 
(6.99) (7.01) (6.89) (6.85) (6.99) (7.27) 
Male 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.48) (0.49) (0.48) 
Religious 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 
(0.60) (0.60) (0.61) (0.60) (0.60) (0.54) 
Married or cohabiting -0.010* -0.010* -0.010* -0.010* -0.010* -0.011** 
(-2.00) (-1.95) (-2.02) (-1.98) (-1.91) (-2.04) 
Childless 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 
(2.91) (2.92) (2.84) (2.89) (2.91) (2.93) 
Residence: big city 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.009 
(0.94) (0.92) (0.78) (0.82) (0.91) (1.00) 
GDP per capita 0.025 0.024 0.005 0.019 0.036 
(0.45) (0.89) (0.13) (0.35) (0.58) 
Unemployment rate 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.007 
(1.37) (1.56) (0.98) (1.20) (1.55) 
Time trends YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Break dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.102 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 
Number of observations 56,037 56,037 56,037 56,037 56,037 56,037 56,037 
Note: Cluster robust t-statistics at country level are reported in brackets. ***, **, * coefficients significant at respectively 1%, 5% 
and 10%. 
 
 
 
37 
Membership and income inequality 
Results reported in Table 3.6 show the association between social capital and income inequality 
when social capital is measured by the participation in “Putnamesque”. The coefficient 
associated with the Gini coefficient is not significantly different from zero, irrespective of the 
covariates included in the analysis. This suggests that participation in associational activity is not 
affected by the country level of income disparities. In columns 4-8, we present further estimates 
of the relationship between membership and income inequality. Column 4 displays the results 
when the Gini coefficient and the macroeconomic variables are contemporaneous to the 
dependent variable while column 5 reports the estimates when both the Gini coefficient and the 
macroeconomic variables are lagged one year. In column 6, we use a three years moving average 
centered at t-2 for the Gini coefficient and the two macroeconomic variables. In column 7, we 
have re-estimated equation (3.1) using a probit model. The conclusion regarding the association 
between membership and income inequality remains unchanged. Finally, we have also checked 
if the results concerning the effect of income inequality on associational activity are modified 
when the membership indicator used so far is replaced by the cumulative number of 
“Putnamesque” organizations to which each respondent belongs to. Again we do not find any 
relationship between membership and income inequality. 
 
Membership and the other covariates 
The discussion below relies on the estimations presented in column 3 of Table 3.6. As for the 
membership indicator, we find that education is a significant determinant of participation in 
associational activities. The magnitude of the estimated coefficients of the two education 
dummies are strikingly similar to those observed for trust. Being unemployed reduces 
participation in associations by 7%. Given that we also control for individual income, this result 
suggests that the unemployment status is detrimental per se for the formation of social capital (i.e. 
not only through the income loss associated with it).  
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Table 3.6: Impact of income inequality on membership 
Note: Cluster robust t-statistics at country level are reported in brackets. . ***, **, * coefficients significant at respectively 1%, 5% 
and 10%.  
Main specifications 
(columns 1-3) 
  
Robustness checks 
(columns 4-8) 
 
 Lags of country-level variables 
2-year 2-year 2-year Nolag 1-year  
3 years 
moving 
average 2-year  2-year 
       
Probit 
 
Membership : 
 change in the 
definition 
Gini coefficient -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 
(-0.49) (-0.88) (-0.16) (-0.09) (0.08) (0.30) (-0.22) (-0.48) 
Age -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.004*** -0.003* 
(-2.65) (-2.74) (-2.71) (-2.72) (-2.72) (-2.93) (-1.90) 
Age squared 0.000* 0.000** 0.000* 0.000** 0.000* 0.000** 0.000 
(1.97) (2.09) (2.04) (2.07) (2.05) (2.21) (1.51) 
Education completion 
age: 15-18 years 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.068*** 0.064*** 
(7.00) (7.06) (7.19) (7.08) (7.13) (8.08) (5.64) 
Education completion 
age: above 19 years 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.115*** 0.116*** 0.142*** 0.172*** 
(11.10) (11.14) (11.23) (11.25) (11.14) (12.21) (8.81) 
Retired -0.011 -0.012* -0.012* -0.012* -0.011* -0.016** -0.017* 
(-1.60) (-1.87) (-1.81) (-1.84) (-1.74) (-2.24) (-1.95) 
Low Income -0.036*** -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.044*** -0.045*** 
(-4.42) (-4.83) (-4.75) (-4.85) (-4.76) (-6.38) (-3.86) 
Unemployed -0.071*** -0.072*** -0.073*** -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.077*** -0.092*** 
(-6.09) (-6.46) (-6.75) (-6.62) (-6.50) (-8.33) (-6.17) 
High Income 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.061*** 
(6.48) (6.35) (6.27) (6.33) (6.29) (7.32) (5.87) 
Male 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.041*** 0.020 
(5.32) (5.31) (5.29) (5.31) (5.31) (5.52) (1.39) 
Religious 0.022** 0.022** 0.022** 0.022** 0.022** 0.021** 0.039*** 
(2.36) (2.35) (2.35) (2.35) (2.40) (2.34) (2.80) 
Married or cohabiting -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.000 
(-0.56) (-0.63) (-0.55) (-0.66) (-0.61) (-0.85) (-0.06) 
Childless 0.026** 0.026** 0.026*** 0.026** 0.026** 0.027*** 0.030** 
(2.77) (2.76) (2.79) (2.74) (2.73) (2.66) (2.33) 
Residence: big city -0.019** -0.020*** -0.019** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.017** -0.036*** 
(-2.59) (-3.01) (-2.70) (-3.00) (-2.80) (-2.48) (-3.45) 
GDP per capita -0.218 -0.076 -0.235 -0.097 -0.219 -0.325 
(-1.27) (-1.49) (-1.43) (-1.17) (-1.18) (-1.19) 
Unemployment rate -0.007 -0.002 -0.006 -0.004 -0.008 -0.008 
(-1.18) (-0.35) (-1.19) (-1.08) (-1.15) (-0.88) 
Time trends YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Break dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.137 0.165 0.166 0.166 0.166 0.165 0.165 0.151 
Observations 58,309 58,309 58,309 58,309 58,309 58,309 58,309 58,309 
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Contrary to the findings of the trust equation, males, religious and childless individuals display 
higher levels of participation in “putnamesque” organizations. In addition, respondents living in 
big cities are around 2% more likely to participate in associational activities.. 
Finally, the GDP per capita and the unemployment rate are not significantly different from zero 
in explaining the probability of participating in associational activities.21 These findings suggest 
that compositional changes in income and employment have no effect on membership, when the 
individual heterogeneity is taken into account. 
 
The empirical analysis presented in this chapter suggests heterogeneous results. On the one hand, 
income inequality appears to be negatively and significantly associated with trust, and this 
relationship is robust to several specifications. On the other hand, participation in associational 
activities does not show any statistically significant correlation with income disparities. 
  
                                                           
21 As we state in the preceding section, this is probably the result of controlling concurrently for the country fixed 
effects and the macroeconomic variables. 
40 
4. The impact of income inequality on happiness 
4.1 The rationale 
The discussion on whether income inequality affects an individual's happiness dates back to 
theoretical considerations on relative deprivation and relative utility and refers to the idea that 
people's utility depends not only on their own income but also on their relative position in the 
society (van de Stadt, Kapteyn and van de Geer, 1985). In addition, some scholars suggest that 
individuals can have a “taste for equality”. In particular, Thurow (1971, p.327) proposes that “the 
individual is simply exercising an aesthetic taste for equality or inequality similar in nature to a 
taste for paintings”. 
An intuitive and comprehensive explanation of the impact of income inequality on individuals' 
well-being is provided by Hirschman and Rothschild (1973). These authors use the analogy of a 
traffic jam on a two-lane motorway to explain the effect of income inequality on happiness and 
call this the “tunnel effect”' (Hirschman and Rothschild (1973), p.545): 
“Suppose that I drive through a two-lane tunnel, both lanes going the same direction, 
and run into a serious traffic jam. No car is moving in either lane as far as I can see 
(which is not very far). I am in the left lane and feel dejected. After a while the cars 
in the right lane begin to move. Naturally, my spirits lift considerably, for I know 
that the jam has been broken and that my lane's turn to move will surely come any 
moment now. But suppose that the expectation is disappointed and only the right 
lane keeps moving: in that case I will at some point become quite furious”. 
This analogy nicely illustrates several important aspects in the relationship between income 
inequality and happiness. First, inequality may convey information about future prospects. This 
means that if I observe that the people around me are moving, then I expect to be able to move 
upward soon too. This suggests that income inequality might have a positive effect on 
individuals' wellbeing. 
Second, the positive impact of inequality might turn negative if these expectations are not 
fulfilled, i.e. if my lane is still not moving. This has important consequences for countries in 
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different development stages and there is empirical evidence on transition countries supporting 
this notion (as discussed below).  
Last, the question arises at what point people do get “upset” about their lane not moving. This 
refers to people's beliefs on whether mobility is possible in their country and how difficult it is 
for people to move upwards. 
In conclusion, income inequality might affect positively the individual's level of happiness if 
people perceive that in their society upward mobility is possible. However, if individuals think 
that it is very unlikely to reach a higher income, then income inequality will probably impact 
negatively on happiness. 
 
4.2 Existing empirical evidence 
There exists quite substantial empirical evidence on the impact of income inequality on 
happiness or life satisfaction, mainly covering the U.S., Europe and transition countries (for an 
overview see Table 4.1). As anticipated theoretically, the effect of income inequality on 
happiness critically depends on whether (i) individuals perceive the society open to upward 
mobility and (ii) it is likely that they will eventually be able to reach higher income levels. 
Evidence can thus be divided into the low-mobile countries (typically European), where 
inequality has a negative effect on satisfaction, and the highly mobile society such as the U.S. 
and transition countries, where there seems to be a greater variability in the outcomes of income 
inequality.  
 
For European countries, Senik (2006) finds that inequality has a negative effect on life 
satisfaction. Alesina et al. (2004) show that this result is driven by the detrimental effect of 
income inequality on people with low income and to those belonging to the left ideological 
spectrum. On the contrary, richer individuals seem indifferent about income inequality.  
Schwarze and Harpfer (2007) report that income inequality has a negative effect on life 
satisfaction in Germany, while Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) show that the higher the income of the 
reference group is, the lower is the level of happiness. Clark (2006) reports similar findings for 
Britain while using life satisfaction as the outcome. Additionally, Clark (2006) argues that higher 
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income inequality within the reference group actually increases life satisfaction.  The latter effect 
might convey some form of ‘opportunity’ feeling similar to some of the findings in the U.S. 
The evidence for the U.S. is somewhat mixed. Senik (2006) conclude that, in contrast to the 
evidence from Europe, inequality in the U.S. has a positive effect on life satisfaction. This result 
is challenged by evidence provided by McBride (2001), Luttmer (2005), and Dynan and Ravina 
(2007). These scholars report that a higher ‘reference group income’ negatively affects happiness. 
A more nuanced view can be found in Alesina et al. (2004), who investigate different income 
levels and incorporate the political preferences of individuals. Their finding is that in the U.S. it 
is the rich people, who are particularly unhappy about higher levels of income inequality, 
whereas the poor are indifferent to inequality. Hence, some of the contrasting evidence might be 
explained by different samples of individuals. 
Last, several studies exist on the impact of inequality on happiness in transition countries. While 
Sanfey and Teksoz (2005) show that inequality has a negative impact on life satisfaction in 
various transition countries, Senik (2006) conclude that the income of the reference group and 
the level of satisfaction are positively related in transition countries. Moreover, the author 
provides evidence that this effect is particularly strong for younger people, i.e. below 41 years, 
and for individuals, who experienced higher income volatility. Similarly, for Russia, Senik (2004) 
finds a positive impact of the ‘reference group income’ on life satisfaction and no significant 
effect for income inequality. The variability of the results is confirmed in Grosfeld and Senik’s 
(2008) study on Poland. Here, the authors find that there has been a major structural change in 
the perception of income inequality after 1997. Before 1997, income inequality is positively 
associated with life satisfaction and individual’s expectations about the future. After 1997, 
however, income inequality is not significantly associated anymore with life satisfaction. This is 
explained by the perception of Polish people that they were not benefitting from the economic 
transformation. 
In conclusion, empirical evidence strongly suggests that the perception of income inequality as a 
negative force in the society depends critically on the perceived country mobility and might 
differ by income group, political preferences, and age. For Europe, a negative impact of income 
inequality or of the ‘reference group income’ on happiness is observed. Transition between 
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political regimes may render the association inequality/happiness positive or negative in time 
depending on the level of expectation raised and their possible fulfillment or delusion. 
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Table 4.1: Studies on income inequality and happiness 
Author Data Inequality measure (INE) 
Main outcome (O) 
Method Results 
Alesina, Di Tella, 
& MacCulloch, 
2004 
US, individuals 
Period: 1981-1996 
 
12 European countries, 
individuals, 
1975-1992 
INE: Gini 
O: Happiness or life 
satisfaction 
Ordered probit, state and year dummies, 
robust standard errors 
Overall inequality found to decrease happiness.  
However, strong differences between US and Europe: in the 
US, the rich are unhappy about inequality and poor are 
indifferent while in Europe the poor and leftist individuals 
care about inequality and rich are indifferent. 
Dynan & Ravina, 
2007 
US, individuals, 
1979-2004 
 
INE: relative income measure: 
own group income – other 
people’s income 
O: Happiness 
Pooled OLS Happiness is higher if income of own group is higher than 
the income of other people  
Schwarze & 
Harpfer, 2007 
West Germany, individuals 
1985-1998 
INE: Gini, Theil and Atkinson, 
- income quintile 
O: Life satisfaction 
Ordered probit, region and time fixed 
effects and individual random effects, 
robust standard errors (and also pooled 
OLS and panel fixed effects) 
Inequality: negative effect on life satisfaction, but only when 
measured with Gini or Theil, not for Atkinson  
Relative income position (income quintile): no impact on life 
satisfaction 
Clark A. E., 2006 Britain, individuals, 
1991-2002 
 
INE: Gini based on reference 
group income 
O: Life satisfaction and the 
GHQ-12 
 
Ordered probit, clustered standard errors 
(but also panel random effects, fixed 
effects logit and random effects probit) 
Reference group income has a negative impact on life 
satisfaction. Life satisfaction 
is positively related to reference group income inequality.  
Grosfeld & Senik, 
2008 
Poland, individuals, INE: Gini, reference group 
income 
Ordered logit, year and region dummies, 
clustered standard errors (and sup-Wald 
Both satisfaction and expectations of the future are positively 
influenced by inequality up to 1997. Afterwards, inequality 
has no effect on expectations and has a negative effect on 
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1992-2005 O: Life satisfaction and private 
expectations of the future 
test) satisfaction. Similar results when the income of the reference 
group is used.  
Sanfey & Teksoz, 
2005 
19 European countries 
1981-84,1990-93, 1995-97, 
1999-2002 
INE: Gini 
O: Life satisfaction 
Ordered probit, country dummies High inequality is associated with lower life satisfaction for 
transition countries and with higher life satisfaction for non-
transition countries. 
Senik, 2006 European countries, 
transition countries, US, 
individuals 
 
INE: reference income and 
surplus of individual income 
beyond reference income   
O: Life satisfaction 
Conditional fixed effects logit, time 
dummies (also ordered probit model) 
Inequality is negative for ‘old’ European countries and 
positive in post-transition economies and the US 
 
Luttmer, 2005 US, individuals,  
1987-88, 1992-94 
INE: Reference income in the 
neighborhood 
O: Happiness 
Pooled OLS, state, survey wave, and 
individual fixed effects (also ordered 
probit) 
Higher reference earnings are associated with lower levels of 
happiness 
Senik, 2004 Russia, individuals, 
1994-2000 
INE: Reference group income, 
Gini 
O: Life satisfaction 
Ordered probit with Mundlak 
transformation of exogenous variables or 
individual fixed effects, and year and 
region fixed effects 
Reference group’s income has a positive effect on 
satisfaction. Inequality indices do not affect individual 
satisfaction. 
 
McBride, 2001 US, individuals 
 1994, and 1972, 1977, 1982, 
1986, 1992 and 1996 
INE: reference group income 
O: Happiness 
Ordered probit Reference group income has a negative effect on happiness.  
Ferrer-i-
Carbonell, 2005 
Germany, individuals, 
1992-1997 
INE: reference group income, 
distance between the 
individual’s own and the 
reference group income 
O: Life satisfaction 
Ordered probit, fixed time effects and 
individual random effects incorporating 
Mundlak transformation 
Reference group income has a negative impact on happiness. 
Individuals are happier the larger their income is in 
comparison to the reference group.  
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4.3 Empirical analysis 
4.3.1 Happiness variable 
The happiness variable is taken from the European Value Survey (EVS) and is related to 
the following question: “Taking all things together, would you say you are: very happy, 
quite happy, not very happy, or not at all happy". The indicator ranges from 4, i.e. very 
happy, to 1, i.e. not at all happy. This measure of happiness is the most commonly used 
in the existing literature.  
In the empirical analysis, we have collapsed the four categories into two categories so as 
to create a dummy variable which takes the value one if the individuals report that they 
feel “very/quite happy”, and zero otherwise. The reasons to proceed in such a way are the 
following.. First, respondents seem not to be evenly distributed across the 4 scores and 
hence this might affect the representativeness of the sample in the different countries. 
Second, as it will be explained below, statistically speaking, there is no difference 
between the categories 1 and 2, i.e.  “not at all happy” and “not too happy”, as well as 
between the categories 3 and 4, i.e., “quite happy’ and “very happy”.  
Chart 4.1 shows the country share of individuals that report a high value of the happiness 
indicator (i.e., reporting to be “quite/very happy”). There are stark differences across 
European Member States and these variations suggest a regional clustering. In fact, 
excluding Czech Republic, all Eastern European countries report the lowest level of 
happiness, while Nordic countries (Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands) along with 
Ireland display the highest level of happiness. 
Chart 4.2 and Table 4.2 provide further information on the evolution over time of the 
share of people reporting high scores of happiness. Chart 4.2 shows the regression line 
when the country-wave specific level of happiness is fitted against a trend. After having 
partialled out for the country fixed effects, the proportion of people reporting to be 
‘‘quite/very happy” has, on average, increased by 0.06 % between each wave.  
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Chart 4.1: Share of the population reporting to be quite/very happy
 
Source: European Values Studies, Waves 1981-1984, 1990-1993, 1999-2001, 2008-2010 
 
Chart 4.2: Evolution of the share of individuals reporting to be quite/very happy 
 
Source: European Values Studies, Waves 1981-1984, 1990-1993, 1999-2001, 2008-2010 
 
 
However, looking at the Table 4.2, the general increasing trend masks significant country 
differences. The Eastern European countries display the highest increase in the 
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proportion of people reporting to be “quite/very happy”, while this marked increase in 
happiness can only be observed in few Western European Member States. Finally, the 
share of happy individuals steadily decreased in Sweden, Austria, Finland, Germany and 
the Netherlands. 
Table 4.2: Evolution of the share of individuals reporting to be quite/very happy 
Country 1981-1984 1990-1993 1999-2001 2008-2010 
Austria . 92.40 89.99 90.60 
Belgium 93.32 93.04 92.35 95.20 
Bulgaria . 39.68 49.36 60.91 
Cyprus . . . 85.63 
Czech Republic . 79.55 87.49 85.83 
Denmark 95.96 94.89 95.60 97.22 
Estonia . 60.50 66.54 80.25 
Finland . 89.49 91.47 85.97 
France 91.63 91.32 92.04 92.63 
Germany 87.33 87.42 79.80 79.03 
Greece . . 75.79 80.90 
Hungary . 69.39 74.09 80.39 
Ireland 96.35 93.69 96.56 94.18 
Italy 78.79 85.90 82.07 88.87 
Latvia . 54.64 58.64 77.51 
Lithuania . 53.11 77.39 67.30 
Luxembourg . . 94.07 94.59 
Netherlands 97.27 95.01 95.65 96.76 
Poland . 56.59 76.34 88.01 
Portugal . 74.66 87.86 85 
Romania . 61.76 46.10 75.56 
Slovak Republic . 60.69 71.47 81.46 
Slovenia . 56.46 76.95 86.88 
Spain 80.51 86.53 88.41 90.56 
Sweden 96.09 . 94.04 89.39 
United Kingdom . 95.19 90.68 91.12 
Source: European Values Studies, Waves 1981-1984, 1990-1993, 1999-2001, 2008-2010 
 
4.3.2 Operationalization of empirical study 
As discussed in Chapter 2, we carry out the empirical investigation by estimating models 
of the form:   
             =   +                 +	      +        +    +   +    + 	       (4.1) 
where              is the happiness measure for the individual i residing in the country c, 
at the time t. The INEQUALITY variable is the two-year lag of the Gini coefficient of 
the country c.      is a vector of individual specific explanatory variables, while       
represents a set of macroeconomic variables which are correlated with both the inequality 
measure and the happiness variable. All models include a vector of country dummies,   , 
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that controls for mean country differences in the level of happiness, a linear trend,   , that 
account for linear shift in the happiness variable common to all countries, and a set of 
break dummies,     , that aims at removing the variation in the Gini index, which is 
caused by the different methodologies used to construct the Gini index (see chapter 2 for 
more detailed information).  
The variables considered in the vector      consist of a series of personal characteristics 
of the respondents that have previously been found to affect individual happiness 
(amongst others, see Blanchflowers and Oswald, 2000 Di Tella et al., 1997, and Alesina 
et al., 2004). More precisely, the variables employed are age and its square, a dummy for 
men, education dummies, labor status of the respondent (unemployed, retired), and 
dummies for high and low income. We also include some socio-demographic 
characteristics such as an indicator of the absence of children in the family, a dummy for 
marital status, a dummy for living in an urban area and a variable indicating if the 
respondent is a religious person. A precise definition of each covariate entering in 
equation (4.1) is presented in Table 4.3. 
The vector W      of macroeconomic variables aims at controlling for the effect of 
country time-variant determinants of happiness. As these variables are also correlated 
with income inequality, failing to include them would imply that the coefficient 
associated with income inequality would capture not only the effect of income inequality 
but also the influence of those additional variables on happiness. Following Alesina et al. 
(2004) and Di Tella et al. (2001) we include the unemployment rate, the inflation rate and 
the log of per capita GDP, in 2005 US dollars. These indicators are drawn from WEO 
database (as described in greater detail in chapter 2). In addition, correlations between 
individual level variables and country level variables are displayed in Tables A.10-11 in 
Appendix. 
Because recent analyses demonstrate that the presence of pervasive serial correlation in 
country level fixed effect models and the use of group-level variables may produce 
severely downward-biased standard errors (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2001; 
Donald and Lang 2001), we employ Huber-White standard errors clustered at the country 
level throughout the estimations. These standard errors are robust to arbitrary forms of 
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error correlation within a country. Since to the authors’ knowledge most empirical papers 
have neglected this issue so far, therefore this “correction” is one of the major advantages 
of the present analysis. 
Table 4.3 Description of Variables  
 Description Source  
Outcome  Variables  
Happiness  Variable equal to 1 if the respondent replies that is “quite/very 
happy” 
EVS 
Country level variables 
GINI Gini coefficient (see chapter 2 for additional information) WIID/EUROSTAT 
Log GDP per capita Logarithm of the per capita gross domestic product in 2005 
dollars 
IMF 
Unemployment rate Percentage of Labor force unemployed IMF 
Inflation rate Annual percent change of average consumer prices IMF 
Individual level variables 
Male Variable equal to one if respondent is male, 0 if female  
Age Age of the respondent EVS  
Age squared Age squared of the respondent EVS 
Unemployed Variable equal to one if the respondent is unemployed, 0 
otherwise  
EVS 
Self-Employed Variable equal to one if the respondent is self-employed, 0 
otherwise 
EVS 
Retired Variable equal to one if the respondent is retired, 0 otherwise EVS 
Married/Cohabiting Variable equal to one if the respondents is married or cohabits 
with someone at the moment of the interview 
EVS 
Education  15-18 Variable equal to one if the respondent completed education when 
he was 15-18 years old,  
EVS 
Education >=19 Variable equal to one if the respondent completed education when 
he was 19 years old or more,  
EVS 
Childless dummy Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent has children, 0 
otherwise 
EVS 
Low income  Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent declares to have a 
low income, 0 otherwise 
EVS 
High income  Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent declares to have a 
high income, 0 otherwise 
EVS 
Religious Variable equal to one if respondent declares to be a religious 
person, 0 otherwise 
EVS 
Big city Variable equal to one if respondent indicates that he/she lives in a 
city with more than 100000 inhabitants, 0 otherwise 
EVS 
Note: Time dummies are also included in all estimates 
 
Since the EVS records the happiness variable as a discrete response indicator with values 
ranging from 4, i.e. very happy, to 1, i.e. not at all happy, the natural candidate estimator 
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for the equation (1) would be a maximum likelihood estimator for ordered dependent 
variable, namely ordered probit/logit. In fact, we started the empirical analysis estimating 
equation (1) by using an ordered probit model. Other than giving the estimated 
coefficients of the control variables, the ordered probit model estimates the cut points 
(and the corresponding standard errors) between the response outcomes, i.e. the 
thresholds that the latent continuous variable must cross to change the value of the 
corresponding happiness discrete variable. These estimated parameters are crucial for 
testing the relevance of the 4-scores happiness variable. 
The results show that only the 2nd and the 3rd cut point are statistically different from 
zero22 , suggesting that we can rule out the lowest category referring to individuals 
reporting themselves as “not at all happy”23. In addition, by looking at the confidence 
bounds of the thresholds we can also discard the discontinuity between the “quite happy” 
and “very happy” category (the upper bound of cut2, equal to 5.82, lies far above the 
lower bound of cut3, which is equal to 2.3). This leaves us with the 2nd cut point to be the 
only statistically relevant threshold. For these reasons, we refrain from using the 4-scores 
variable and instead we apply the binary version of the happiness variable. As a result, 
the dependent variable of equation (4.1) takes on the value one if people report to be 
“quite/very happy” and zero otherwise. We estimate equation (4.1) using ordinary least 
squares and provide the probit estimates as a robustness exercise.24 Furthermore, we also 
report results when a measure of life satisfaction is the dependent variable. Although 
happiness and life satisfaction might capture different aspects of individual wellbeing, 
they are highly correlated, showing a correlation coefficient above 0.75. As a result, we 
do not expect to detect any relevant differences between the two models.25  
                                                           
22 cut 2: 3.09 s.e.:(1.39); cut 3: 5.02 s.e.:(1.38) 
23 cut 1: 1.9 s.e.:(1.38) 
24 Note that the OLS coefficients are readily interpretable as marginal effects at the mean of the other 
covariates. 
25 The EVS measures individual life satisfaction as a discrete response variable with values ranging from 
10, i.e. very satisfied, to 1, i.e. not at all satisfied. However, for comparison’s sake, we have estimated the 
model using the binary version of the life satisfaction score. 
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4.3.3 Econometric results 
Table 4.4 presents the estimated coefficients of the equation (4.1). Columns 1-3 show the 
results of the models where the income inequality is measured by the 2-year lag of the 
Gini coefficient. Model 1 is the baseline estimate that controls only for country and break 
dummies, a linear time trend and the Gini coefficient. Model 2 includes a series of 
individual characteristics which have previously been found to affect individual 
happiness, while model 3 considers macroeconomic confounding variables which may 
potentially be correlated with both the Gini coefficient and individual happiness. Note 
that since the Gini coefficient is fixed within country-year clusters, only country-specific 
variables are likely to be a source of omitted variable bias. This is the main reason of 
including the macroeconomic controls in model 3. 
In order to mitigate the potential issues of reverse causation, the Gini coefficient enter the 
equation with 2-year lag. Although this presents a deviation from the existing literature, 
which usually relies on contemporaneous measure of the Gini index, we think that the 
level of happiness might be influenced by income inequality in the past years. However, 
for the sake of comparison with the previous literature we also estimate the equation (4.1) 
including the contemporaneous Gini. This model is shown in column 4 of Table 4.4. In 
addition, in column 5 we present estimation results using the unweighted three-year 
moving average of the Gini index. Lastly, column 7 reports the model when life 
satisfaction is the dependent variable. 
The estimates reported in column 1 of Table 4.4 show the estimated impact of the 
inequality on the individual happiness. The coefficient of the Gini equals to 0.009. This 
indicates that a 1% rise in the Gini coefficient increases the proportion of people 
reporting to be “quite/very happy” by 0.009 percentage points. Although very small, this 
result is neither consistent with our prior expectations nor with empirical results from 
previous research. However, this impact is estimated imprecisely. The second column 
adds a series of individual characteristics to the estimation model. The added control 
variables are economically and statistically significant with “standard” interpretations 
and in line with the previous literature. For instance, we find an inverted U-shaped effect 
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of age on happiness, i.e. younger people seem to be the least happy compared to the older 
ones. Having completed education at the age of 19 is associated with higher levels of 
happiness, as shown by the coefficient on education. Being unemployed and retired are 
associated with lower levels of happiness. A possible interpretation might be that these 
labour status are correlated with the stress of being jobless. The income dummies clearly 
show that money matters: earning a higher income brings happiness. Men seem not to be 
happier than women and following a religion makes people happier. Regarding the 
marital status, we find that married or cohabiting people are happier than unmarried or 
single ones. In addition, people seem to be less happy if they have at least one child. This 
lower level of happiness for individuals with children might be caused by the 
preoccupations and responsibilities associated with raising children. 
Column 2 of Table 4.4 shows a positive effect of the Gini index on individual happiness. 
However, this counterintuitive effect might be determined by endogeneity of the Gini 
variable, especially the one coming from omitted country determinants of both inequality 
and individual happiness. To tackle this issue, in column 3 we add the following 
macroeconomic variables in the model: unemployment rate, inflation rate and per capita 
GDP. The Gini coefficient turns negatively correlated with the individual level of 
happiness with a magnitude of -0.004, validating our suspect that the previous models are 
strongly affected by omitted variable bias. Indeed, the coefficient of per capita GDP is 
strongly statistically significant, suggesting that the positive effect of the Gini index in 
column 3 stems mainly from the omission of this macroeconomic variable. However the 
negative effect of the Gini is far from being statistically significant. 
Column 5 shows the estimated coefficients where both the Gini measure and the 
macroeconomic variables are calculated as unweighted three-year moving average, 
centered at year t-1. The estimated coefficient of the income inequality becomes smaller, 
moving from -0.004 in column 3 to -0.001, and negatively associated with individual 
wellbeing, but still not statistical different from zero. 
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Table 4.4: Impact of income inequality on happiness 
 
Main specifications 
(columns 1-3) 
Robustness checks (columns 4-7) 
 
 Lags of country-level variables 
 2-year 2-year 2-year No lag 
3 years 
moving 
average 2-year 2-year 
      Probit 
Probit: 
DV life 
satisfaction 
Gini coefficient 0.009** 0.008** -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 
(2.74) (2.69) (-1.18) (-1.34) (-0.23) (-1.52) (-0.47)) 
GDP per capita   0.248*** 0.091** 0.211*** 0.210*** 0.114* 
   (3.38) (2.11) (4.38) (3.52) (1.92) 
Unemployment rate   0.002 0.002 0.006 0.000 0.003 
   (0.60) (0.48) (1.29) (0.11) (1.19) 
Inflation rate   0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000** 0.000*** 
   (1.68) 0.091** (-0.43) 0.210*** (2.24) 
Age -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.029*** -0.011*** -0.012*** 
(-9.88) (-8.80) (-9.13) (-17.52) (-11.16) (-10.44) 
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
(8.26) (7.24) (7.31) (13.54) (8.35) (9.31) 
Education: 15-18 years 0.008 0.007 0.005 0.014 0.006 0.005 
(0.95) (0.85) (0.61) (1.28) (1.01) (0.85) 
Education: above 19 years 0.039*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.048*** 0.038*** 0.044*** 
(3.79) (3.63) (4.13) (3.45) (4.77) (5.77) 
Unemployed -0.138*** -0.144*** -0.143*** -0.218*** -0.110*** -0.143 
(-5.18) (-5.23) (-5.27) (-6.38) (-6.68) (-8.03) 
Retired -0.035*** -0.032*** -0.034*** -0.021 -0.020*** -0.011 
(-3.88) (-3.35) (-3.55) (-1.46) (-2.59) (1.19) 
Low Income -0.072*** -0.068*** -0.070*** -0.113*** -0.056*** -0.068*** 
(-12.56) (-11.50) (-13.49) (-12.88) (-12.41) (-13.12) 
High Income 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.072*** 0.032*** 0.058*** 
(4.53) (4.09) (4.48) (8.00) (6.67) (11.36) 
Male 0.001 0.003 0.005 -0.003 0.000 0.003 
(0.15) (0.73) (1.30) (-0.34) (0.07) (0.90) 
Religious 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.080*** 0.023*** 0.027** 
(3.19) (3.07) (3.50) (7.25) (3.41) (2.68) 
Married or cohabiting 0.106*** 0.104*** 0.105*** 0.238*** 0.096*** 0.067*** 
(12.67) (11.48) (11.54) (17.42) (14.69) (12.22) 
Childless 0.014** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.009 0.012** 0.002* 
(2.35) (2.83) (2.86) (1.01) (2.38) (1.92) 
Residence: big city -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.018 -0.006 -0.009 
(-0.54) (-0.43) (-0.44) (-1.71) (-1.47) (-1.42) 
Time trends YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Break dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.119 0.168 0.169 0.166 0.153 0.175 0.129 
Observations 78769 66049 58309 62068 60706 58,309 58049 
Note: Cluster robust t-statistics (z-score for the probit model) at country level are reported in brackets. ***, **, * 
coefficients significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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In column 6 we analyse whether our results might be affected by the functional form of 
the estimated model. In particular, we investigate whether the probit model, which 
assumes a nonlinear functional form between the explanatory variables and the 
dependent variable, is better suited to estimate equation (1). The marginal effects of the 
probit model reported in column 6 of Table 4.3 are unambiguously similar to the 
coefficient of the model 3, suggesting that the functional form is not a serious concern. 
Likewise, the coefficient of the Gini index remains statistically insignificant with a 
magnitude of -0.004.  
Finally, we obtain similar results when individual wellbeing is proxied by life satisfaction 
dummy variable (column 7). The coefficient attached to the Gini index is negatively 
related to wellbeing but still not statistically significant. 
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5. The impact of income inequality on health 
5.1 The rationale 
The following paragraph draws mainly on d'Hombres et al. (2012, section 3; as well as 
Leigh et al., 2009, Deaton, 2003, and Gravelle, 1998) and discusses the three most widely 
researched mechanisms to connect income inequality and health.  
The absolute income hypothesis postulates that an individual’s health status increases 
with individual income but at a decreasing rate (see Figure 5.1). This means that one 
extra Euro given to a deprived person increases his/her health status more than the same 
Euro spent on a rich person. Hence, there exists a non-linear relationship between income 
and health status. Figure 5.2 illustrates this argument by displaying at the country level 
the bivariate relationship between life expectancy and GDP per capita. This non-linear 
relationship was found between countries when comparing richer and poorer countries 
but also within countries (Leigh et al., 2009). As Deaton (2003) argues, this supports the 
idea that within a country a redistribution of income from richer to poorer individuals 
will increase the overall health status. In other words, under the absolute income 
hypothesis an effect of income inequality on health would be caused by the non-linear 
relationship of income and health. 
The second mechanism proposed in the literature is the relative income hypothesis. The 
relative income hypothesis postulates that an individual’s relative income position within 
a country affects the individual’s health status. The rationale for this hypothesis is not 
clearly spelled out in the literature. Most scholars, however, propose the following 
mechanism: lower relative income increases chronic stress of individuals, due to an 
increased feeling of deprivation. This chronic stress is then seen to translate into an 
unhealthier life (Leigh et al., 2009).  
The last mechanism to explain why income inequality might affect health relies on the 
idea of societal effects and, in particular, the effect of increased violence due to higher 
income inequality. Higher violence and crime rates might lead to higher death rates (i.e. 
homicides) but also to increased levels of stress, which then translate into worse health 
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outcomes. Other societal effects mentioned in the literature are related to societal 
heterogeneity.  
Figure 5.1: Non-linear relationship of income and health  
 
Source: Leigh et al., 2009, p. 6 
 
Figure 5.2: Cross- country evidence of life expectancy and income 
 
Source: Deaton, 2003, p. 116 
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In particular, greater heterogeneity is seen to hinder societies to agree on investments in 
public goods (cf. Alesina et al., 1999). This implies, that higher income inequality might 
lead to lower investments in the health sector, e.g. in hospitals, and this then might 
translate into lower health status of the surrounding population (cf. Leigh et al., 2009). 
 
5.2 Existing empirical evidence 
As already discussed in d'Hombres et al. (2012, section 3), there exists a rich literature 
dating back to the 1970s analyzing the relationship between income inequality and health 
(an overview over the studies is displayed in Table 5.1). In a more recent series of articles 
Wilkinson (1992, 1994, and 1996) concludes in favor of a negative impact of income 
inequality on health. However, this view was challenged by scholars who pointed out 
strong inconsistencies in the use of data (Judge, 1995)26  In particular, the effect of 
income inequality on health seems to be sensitive to the (i) selected dependent and 
independent variables included in the estimations, (ii) underlying regional focus of the 
study, (iii) estimation methods employed and (iv) unit of observation (individuals, state, 
or country analysis). 
The comprehensive review of studies performed by Lynch et al. (2004) suggests that 
income inequality has not a negative effect on health status at least among wealthier 
nations, such as Belgium, Denmark, and Spain (ibid, p.54). In particular, Lynch et al. 
(2004) argue that there is a positive effect of income inequality on mortality rates in 
Belgium (Lorant et al., 2001) while inequality is not related to mortality or heart disease 
in Denmark (Osler et al., 2003), and to disabilities or life expectancy in Spain (Regidor et 
al., 1997). Similarly, Gerdtham and Johannesson (2004) did not find any significant 
effect of income inequality on mortality in Sweden. The evidence for the UK is more 
mixed. On the one hand, Stanistreet et al. (1999) report a significant effect of income 
inequality on health but, on the other hand this result is challenged by Weich et al. (2001 
and 2002).  
                                                           
26 In particular, Judge (1995, p.1283) points out that the econometric results produced by Wilkinson might 
be explained by the use of an incorrect poverty estimate and the use of different years when matching 
income and life expectancy.  
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Additional evidence is provided by Hildebrand and Van Kerm’s (2009) for 11 European 
countries. In particular, the authors test the relationship by employing data at the NUTS0 
and NUTS1 level in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Ireland, 
Portugal, Spain and the UK. Although the authors find a statistically significant effect of 
income inequality on self-reported health status in EU countries, the magnitude of this 
effect is negligible. In contrast to the studies based on EU countries, the empirical results 
for the U.S. point to a consistent and negative effect of income inequality on health status 
(see Lynch et al., 2004).  
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Table 5.1: Studies on income inequality and health 
Topic Data Inequality measure (INE) 
Main outcome (O) 
Method Results 
Lorant et al. (2001) Belgium, municipalities, 
1985-93 
INE: Gini 
O: Mortality and morbidity variables 
Weighted least squares model and 
simultaneous autoregressive model  
Higher income inequality is associated 
with lower mortality rates 
Osler et al. (2003) Denmark, individuals,  
1964, 1992 
INE: Median share of income in municipality 
O: Ischaemic heart disease 
Cox’s proportional hazard 
regression models 
No clear association between income 
inequality and Ischaemic heart disease 
Regidor et al. 
(1997) 
Spain, regions,1986 INE: Difference in the mean household income 
between those at the bottom and those at the top 
of  the income hierarchy 
O: Prevalence of long term disabilities 
Logistic regressions Income inequality does not affect 
disabilities 
Gerdtham and 
Johannesson (2004) 
Sweden, individuals, 
1980-86 
INE: Gini, Robin Hood index, median income, 
variance of income 
O: Survival time in years (mortality) 
Cox’s proportional hazard regression 
models 
Income inequality does not affect 
mortality rates 
Stanistreeet et al 
(1999) 
UK, individuals, 1991  INE: squared coefficient of variation 
O: Mortality 
OLS Income inequality does affect mortality 
Weich et al. (2001) UK, individuals, 1991 INE: Gini 
O: Prevalence of mental disorder 
Logistic regression, with clustered 
standard errors 
Mental disorders were more common in 
areas with greater income inequality 
Weich et al. (2002) UK, individuals, 1991 INE: Gini 
O: Self-rated health 
Logistic regressions, with clustered 
standard errors 
Income inequality is weakly related to 
worse self-rated health 
Hildebrand and Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Greece, Italy, 
INE: Gini, Theil index, mean log deviation, 
coefficient of variation, ratio of 90/10 
Panel fixed effects estimation Income inequality is negatively related to 
self-rated health status but the magnitude 
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Van Kerm (2009) Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the 
UK, NUTS0 and NUTS1 level, 
1994-2001 
O: Self-reported health status of the impact of inequality on health is 
low 
 
Leigh and Jencks 
(2007) 
Australia, Canada, France, 
Germany, Ireland; Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, UK, US,  1903 - 
2003 
INE: Income of richest 10%  
O: Life expectancy at birth and infant mortality 
 
Country and year fixed effects 
estimation, robust s.e., clustered at 
country level 
 
No relationship between mortality and 
inequality  
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5.3 Empirical analysis  
5.3.1 Health variables 
While there are some cross-country studies (cf. Leigh and Jencks, 2006; and Judge et al., 1998) on 
the effect of income inequality on health, more elaborated studies use individual-level data (see 
Hildebrand and Van Kerm, 2009; Gerdtham and Johannesson, 2004; and Subramanian and 
Kawachi, 2003). These analyses are able to distinguish between different mechanisms through 
which income inequality might affect health. Hence, in a first step, we employ individual level 
data from the EVS to analyze the effect of income inequality on self-reported health. In a second 
step, we use country level data on life expectancy to estimate the effect of income inequality on a 
country’s average level of health.  
As already discussed in chapter 2, EVS is used to measure the social outcomes analyzed in this 
study. In particular, to examine the effect of income inequality on health, we rely on self-reported 
health information. More precisely, in the EVS, respondents are asked “All in all, how would you 
describe your state of health these days? Would you say it is...”. Possible answers include very 
good, good, fair, poor and very poor. For our baseline specification, the dependent health 
indicator ranges from 1 to 5, with 1 measuring very poor health and 5 very good health.  
Chart 5.1 displays the country average value of the population declaring to have good or very 
good health. It is apparent that the level of people perceiving to be in a good health status varies 
substantially across countries. In general, in most EU Member States over 50% of the population 
reports good or very good health scores. Highest shares of individuals reporting good or very 
good health, i.e. over 80%, are found in the Ireland, Denmark and Greece. Lowest levels of 
citizens reporting good or very good health levels, i.e. below 50%, are observed in Lithuania, 
Latvia, Estonia and Hungary. 
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Chart 5.1: Share of the population reporting to have good or very good health
 
Source: European Values Studies, Waves 1981-1984, 1990-1993, 2008-2010 
Notes: No information on self-reported health in the 1999-2001 EVS wave 
 
Chart 5.2 and Table 5.2 give some information on the evolution over time in the level of self-
reported health. Chart 5.2 shows the regression line when the country-wave specific level of 
health is fitted against a trend, and this, after having partialled out for the country fixed effects. 
Self-reported health, on average, has increased over the different waves of the European Values 
Survey. However, by looking at the Table 5.2, this average trend hides some country-specific 
trends. On the one hand, some countries have shown over time a marked increase in the share of 
the population with good or very good self-perceived health status, such as in the Czech Republic 
from 52% (1990-1993) to 68% (2008-2010). On the other hand, other countries have registered a 
drop in the share of population with good or very good self-perceived health status; for instance in 
the UK this share decreased from 78% (1981-1984) to 76% (2008-2010). 
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Chart 5.2: Evolution over time in the share of the population reporting good or very good health. 
 
Source: European Values Studies, Waves 1981-1984, 1990-1993, 2008-2010 
Table 5.2: Evolution over time of the share of individuals with good/very good self-perceived health 
Country 1981-1984 1990-1993 2008-2010 
Austria  65.68 79.7 
Belgium 74.23 76.39 77.17 
Bulgaria  54.94 56.8 
Cyprus   77.52 
Czech Republic  52.21 67.94 
Denmark 81.19 82.35 83.09 
Estonia  34.94 52.42 
Finland  77.73 62.63 
France 64.06 67.13 72.22 
Germany 61.28 61.23 65.88 
Greece   81.74 
Hungary  34.1 56.08 
Ireland 79.68 84.07 84.53 
Italy 55.43 61.11 71.75 
Latvia  33.8 45.54 
Lithuania  44.75 51.3 
Luxembourg   79.71 
Netherlands 76.12 74.62 78.19 
Poland  36.7 65.41 
Portugal  47.19 60.52 
Romania  48.31 57.32 
Slovakia  51.34 54.68 
Slovenia  41.45 68.51 
Spain 51.51 58.71 78.06 
Sweden 74.42  81.1 
United Kingdom 77.88 78.98 76.29 
Source: European Values Studies, Waves 1981-1984, 1990-1993, 2008-2010. 
Notes: No information on self-reported health in the 1999-2001 EVS wave 
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Since self-reported health is a subjective measure of individuals’ health status, we also used a 
more objective measure of health status in a population, i.e. life expectancy. Data on life 
expectancy is available from the WDI database (World Bank, 2013) for the period 1996 to 2009 
and refers to the country-level life expectancy at birth in years.   
Chart 5.3 displays life-expectancy in years for the most recent year (2009) by country. Lower 
levels of life-expectancy can be found in Eastern European countries, such as Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania and Bulgaria. Highest levels of life expectancy, i.e. over 81 years, are present in Spain, 
France, Italy and Sweden.  
 
Chart 5.3: Country-level life-expectancy (2009)
 
Source: Eurostat (2013a) 
 
Chart 5.4 and Table 5.3 give some information on the evolution in the level of self-reported health 
between 1996 and 2009. Chart 5.4 shows the regression line when the country-wave specific level 
of health is fitted against a trend, once country fixed effects are taken into account. Life 
expectancy, on average, has increased between 1996 and 2009. As can be deduced from Table 5.3, 
this positive trend seems to be true throughout Europe. Depending on the initial life expectancy in 
1996, countries have seen increases in the life-expectancy by as few as 2.1 years (for Cyprus) or 
as many as 4.9 years (Estonia). 
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Table 5.3: Evolution over time of life-expectancy 
country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
AT 76.98 77.39 77.57 77.78 78.03 78.53 78.68 78.63 79.18 79.33 79.83 79.98 80.23 80.08 
BE 76.92 77.22 77.87 78.07 78.17 78.47 78.58 78.73 78.88 79.33 79.78 80.23 80.43 80.63 
BG 70.90 70.35 71.06 71.41 71.66 71.77 71.87 72.07 72.56 72.56 72.61 72.66 72.96 73.41 
CY 77.59 77.81 78.04 78.26 78.48 78.69 78.88 79.05 79.20 79.33 79.45 79.56 79.66 79.77 
CZ 73.71 73.82 74.51 74.67 74.97 75.17 75.22 75.17 75.72 75.92 76.52 76.72 76.98 77.08 
DE 76.67 77.07 77.48 77.73 77.93 78.33 78.23 78.38 78.68 78.93 79.13 79.53 79.74 79.94 
DK 75.59 75.95 76.14 76.34 76.59 76.79 76.90 77.14 77.49 77.84 78.10 78.20 78.45 78.60 
EE 69.84 70.19 69.36 70.06 70.42 70.26 70.90 71.32 71.91 72.57 72.69 72.81 73.77 74.82 
EL 77.69 78.14 77.84 77.99 77.89 78.39 78.64 78.84 79.04 79.24 79.44 79.44 79.94 80.19 
ES 78.12 78.60 78.67 78.72 78.97 79.37 79.57 79.62 79.87 80.17 80.82 80.82 81.88 81.53 
FI 76.69 76.88 77.09 77.29 77.47 77.97 78.12 78.37 78.71 78.82 79.21 79.26 79.57 79.72 
FR 78.00 78.36 78.46 78.61 78.96 79.06 79.26 79.26 80.16 80.11 80.51 80.81 80.87 81.07 
HU 70.33 70.70 70.56 70.68 71.25 72.25 72.35 72.30 72.65 72.65 73.10 73.15 73.70 73.90 
IE 75.79 75.97 76.20 76.07 76.54 77.14 77.64 77.92 78.20 78.48 78.76 79.04 79.14 79.50 
IT 78.33 78.63 78.43 78.83 79.43 79.83 79.98 79.93 80.73 80.58 81.13 81.29 81.23 81.44 
LT 70.11 70.91 71.22 71.57 72.02 71.66 71.76 72.06 71.96 71.25 71.06 70.90 71.81 72.91 
LU 76.52 76.88 77.02 77.77 77.87 77.82 78.20 78.58 78.96 79.33 79.71 80.09 80.09 80.09 
LV 68.78 69.35 69.01 69.74 70.31 70.76 70.96 71.27 72.03 71.36 70.87 71.02 72.42 73.08 
MT 77.29 77.44 77.18 77.15 78.20 78.44 78.09 78.35 78.55 79.50 78.55 79.44 79.43 79.90 
NL 77.44 77.79 77.88 77.84 77.99 78.19 78.29 78.49 79.10 79.35 79.70 80.10 80.25 80.55 
PL 72.25 72.65 73.00 73.04 73.75 74.20 74.50 74.60 74.85 75.00 75.14 75.24 75.54 75.70 
PT 75.01 75.41 75.71 75.96 76.31 76.81 77.07 77.22 77.67 78.07 78.42 78.32 78.52 78.73 
RO 69.10 69.00 69.81 70.51 71.16 71.16 71.01 71.31 71.59 71.88 72.16 72.57 72.57 73.31 
SE 78.96 79.20 79.34 79.44 79.64 79.80 79.85 80.10 80.50 80.55 80.75 80.90 81.10 81.35 
SI 74.43 74.72 74.81 75.01 75.41 75.76 76.01 76.86 77.21 77.61 78.09 78.56 78.77 78.97 
SK 72.65 72.70 72.55 72.90 73.05 73.40 73.60 73.60 73.96 73.90 74.20 74.21 74.70 74.91 
UK 77.09 77.21 77.19 77.39 77.74 77.99 78.14 78.45 78.75 79.05 79.25 79.45 79.60 80.05 
Source: Eurostat (2013a) 
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Chart 5.4: Evolution over time life-expectancy 
 
Source: Eurostat (2013a) 
5.3.2 Operationalization of the empirical study 1: income inequality and self-reported health 
We investigate the effect of income inequality on self-reported health by estimating models of the 
form: 
     ℎ    =   +                 +	      +        +    +	  	+		    + 	      (5.1) 
where      ℎ    is the self-reported measure of health for individual i, residing in country c, at 
time t. As a measure of inequality, we use the Gini coefficient.      is a vector of individual and 
household specific explanatory variables, while        represents the country level variables 
lagged by two years, and   	 and	   are respectively the linear trend and country dummies. Finally, 
    are the break dummies to account for the measurement issues in the Gini coefficient and       
is the idiosyncratic error for individual i at time t residing in country c.                , 
corresponds to the GINI measure 2 years before the EVS survey takes place in a given country. 
Given that in this chapter we use 3 different waves of the EVS, this implies that for each country, 
we cover between 1 and 3 different periods, spanning from the beginning of the 1980s to 2010, 
depending on the number of EVS waves to which the country participated (see Table 5.2). 
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The reason for including a lagged Gini variable and lagged country level variable is as follows. 
Including a lagged structure of the variable allows us to account for delayed effects of the 
explanatory variables on health and to reduce the potential bias driven by reverse causation. 
However, the scholarly debate did not reach a consensus yet on which time lag is most appropriate 
to use when studying the effect of inequality on health. The appropriate lag structure hinges on the 
mechanism underlying the association between income inequality and health. For example rising 
income inequality might harm an individual’s health outcome in the long-run through its effect on 
increasing the stress of managing professional and personal life. On the contrary, if income 
inequality exacerbates crime and homicide rates then the effect on health can occur in the short-
run (Leigh and Jencks, 2007). To check the robustness of our analysis, we also report results when 
using the contemporaneous Gini variable as well as the 3 year lag (see Table 5.5 and Table 5.8).  
We test the validity of the absolute income hypothesis, i.e. an individual’s absolute income affects 
health status, by including in      a measure of an individual’s income. In addition we include a 
conventionally used set of covariates to account for individual level characteristics, i.e. age, sex, 
educational background, information on occupational status, marital status, being religious, and 
number of children (Hildebrand and Van Kerm, 2009; Gerdtham and Johannesson, 2004; and 
Mellor and Milyo, 2002).27 
In the present analysis we also account for some important country-specific characteristics related 
to the country health system. In particular, it is reasonable to assume that a population’s health 
status might depend on health expenditure. Data on a country’s total health expenditure per capita 
in Dollar PPP is available from the OECD (2012). For convenience we transform the variable in 
logarithmic form and denote it by health expenditure. As additional country level variables 
     	, we consider the age distribution in the population by using the variable dependents. This 
variable measures the proportion of people aged 0-15 and 65+ over the 15-64 year-old population. 
Last, we include a measure for the population size per country, i.e. population. The information on 
population is transformed in lognormal form. A precise description of all individual level and 
country level variables can be found in Table 5.4. In addition, correlations between individual 
                                                           
27 Beyond these important individual characteristics, scholars have also included control variables on ethnic identity, 
health care coverage and health behavior, such as exercise, diet, and smoking behavior, in their estimations (Mellor 
and Milyo, 2002). Due to data limitation of the EVS, we are however neither able to account for the origin of the 
individual nor for his health behavior.  
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level variables and country level variables are displayed in Tables A.2-3 in Appendix. The final 
sample used in Table 5.5 is depicted in Appendix, Table A.1.28 
 
Table 5.4 Description of Variables  
 Description Source  
Outcome Variables  
Self-reported health  Variable equal to 1-5, with higher values representing better self-
reported health  
EVS 
Poor health Variable equal to one if the respondent replies that he/she has poor 
or very poor health, 0 otherwise 
EVS 
Country level variables 
Gini Gini coefficient (see chapter 2) WIID/EUROSTAT 
Health expenditure Total health expenditure per capita in Dollar PPP, in logs OECD (2012) 
Dependents Ratio of people younger than 15 or older than 64 to the working-
age population, i.e. those aged 15-64 years. 
World Bank (2013) 
Population Total population, in logs World Bank (2013) 
Individual level variables 
Male Variable equal to one if respondent is male, 0 if female EVS 
Age Age of the respondent EVS  
Age squared Age squared of the respondent EVS 
Unemployed Variable equal to one if the respondent is unemployed, 0 otherwise  EVS 
Retired Variable equal to one if the respondent is retired 0 otherwise EVS 
Married/Cohabiting Variable equal to one if the respondents is married or cohabits with 
someone at the moment of the interview 
EVS 
Education >=19 Variable equal to one if the respondent completed education when 
he was 19 years old or more,  
EVS 
Childless  Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent has children, 0 
otherwise  
EVS 
Religious Variable equal to one if respondent declares to be a religious 
person, 0 otherwise 
EVS 
Low income  Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent declares to have a 
low income, 0 otherwise 
EVS 
High income  Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent declares to have a 
high income, 0 otherwise 
EVS 
                                                           
28 Notice that it has been argued that the relative financial position of individuals affects their health status, i.e. the 
relative income hypothesis. To test this hypothesis, scholars have used the mean income of the respective reference 
group (Deaton, 2003; and Deaton and Paxson, 2004). However, the construction of the reference group varies, with 
scholars using geographical proximity (Hildebrand and Van Kerm, 2009; and Gerdtham and Johannesson, 2004) or 
occupational group. In this analysis, we cannot derive the mean income of a reference group based on occupational 
and geographical related factors as this would require detailed income data for the reference group and the EVS does 
not provide such information. The only available data in the EVS on an individual’s income categorizes individuals 
into three income categories, i.e. low, medium and high income, and hence does not exhibit enough variability to 
compute the reference group income. Being income inequality measured at the national level, it intuitively implies 
that the reference group corresponds to the whole population. While the use of a country-level inequality variable 
might be limited with respect to other studies, this disadvantage is compensated by the longitudinal form of the 
income inequality indicator. More precisely, we are able to test for delayed responses of income inequality on health 
outcomes while studies including the mean income of the reference group only consider the contemporaneous effect 
of income inequality on health (a notable exception is Hildebrand and Van Kerm, 2009). We believe that this 
constitutes an improvement with respect to former studies. 
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 Note: Wave, break and country dummies are also included in all estimates. 
5.3.3 Econometric results 1: income inequality and self-reported health 
Estimation results for the effect of income inequality on self-reported health are displayed in 
Table 5.5. Linear regressions are used for estimating models 1-5. We start with a baseline 
estimation, which only includes the Gini variable as the main explanatory variable, as well as a 
linear trend, break dummies and country dummies. This model is presented in column 1 of Table 
5.5. Column 2 includes individual-level variables, while column 3 also considers macroeconomics 
variables. In addition, a series of robustness checks are reported in columns 4-7. In particular, we 
re-estimate model 3 by using the contemporaneous Gini variable and the 3 year lag of the Gini 
coefficient instead of the 2 year lag (columns 4 and 5 respectively). Next, we check whether our 
results are robust to a different operationalization of the dependent variable. While in the 
estimations 1-5 we employ the 5-score health variable, estimation results in columns 6-7, the 
dependent variable is a binary variable which is equal to 1 if respondents declare to have very 
poor or poor health and 0 otherwise. In these cases, we apply a maximum likelihood estimator 
which account for the nonlinear relationship between the dependent and explanatory variables, 
namely the probit model. A two-year and a three-year lag are used in models 6 and 7 respectively. 
Note that Huber-White standard errors clustered at the country level are used throughout the 
aforementioned estimations. These standard errors are robust to arbitrary forms of error 
correlation within a country. 
The most important conclusion reached from the estimation results presented in Table 5.5 is that 
once we control for individual and macroeconomic variables, in none of the regressions does the 
Gini coefficient turn significant. This suggests that income inequality is not significantly related to 
self-reported health. This result holds irrespective of the lag structure used for the Gini index, i.e. 
no lag, 2 and 3 year lag, and the hypothesized functional form of the model. 
On the other hand, the individual level variables are significantly different from zero and with the 
expected sign. In particular, older individuals have a lower self-reported health status (or a higher 
probability of having reported very poor or poor health, in estimations 6 and 7) and the negative 
effect of age decreases with increasing age (as can be seen by the significant age squared variable). 
Moreover, men have a higher self-reported health status (or lower probability for poor health). In 
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addition, more educated people have higher levels of self-reported health (or lower probability for 
poor health). For individuals who are either unemployed or retired the estimation results suggest 
that health statuses are lower compared to the omitted group (employed). Next, we find that our 
results support the absolute income hypothesis, i.e. a significant effect of individual income on 
self-reported health. In particular, compared to medium income (i.e. the omitted category), 
individual with low income are associated with lower self-reported health, whereas high income 
earners exhibit better self-reported health outcomes. Being a religious person does not affect self-
reported health when measured on a 1-5 scale, but turns significantly positive for the binary 
dependent variable.  In addition, there seems to be a positive effect of being in a stable partnership 
and having children. In particular, individuals who are either married or cohabitate and/or have 
children seem to have higher levels of health (or lower probability of having poor health). 
Now turning to the country-level variables, our estimations suggest that there might be a 
significant relationship between public health expenditure and self-reported health. More precisely, 
when using a three year lag, higher spending on health seems to increase self-reported health (and 
decrease the probability of having poor health, see columns 4 and 6). In addition, the size of the 
population is negative and significant. Last, the dependency ratio remains largely insignificant 
throughout the estimations. Note that a further robustness check, where population is excluded 
from the estimation is reported in Table A.4 in the Appendix.29 
                                                           
29 In contrast to estimations on happiness and social capital we do not include GDP per capita in the estimations on self-reported 
health, since GDP per capita is highly correlated with health expenditure (correlation coefficient = 0.82) and when both variables 
are included in the estimation their coefficients cannot be estimated precisely, i.e. they both turn insignificant. However, the 
coefficient of the Gini coefficient remains unchanged to the inclusion of GDP per capita in the estimation (results not shown). 
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Table 5.5: Results for self-reported health 
 Main specifications (columns 1-3) Robustness checks (columns 4-7) 
 Lags of country-level variables 
 2-year 2-year 2-year No lag 3-year 2-year 3-year 
 (1) Baseline (2) Adding 
individual 
characteristics 
(3) Adding country-
level variables 
(4) (5) (6) DV: Poor 
health 
(7) DV: Poor 
health 
      Probit Probit 
Gini 0.02*** 0.01*** -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.53) (0.83) (0.32) (0.27) (0.11) 
Age  -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age squared  0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Male  0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** -0.07*** -0.07*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education>=19  0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** -0.14*** -0.15*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Unemployed  -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Retired  -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.20*** 0.29*** 0.28*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Low income  -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
High income  0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** -0.21*** -0.21*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Religious  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.05* 0.05* 
  (0.61) (0.61) (0.65) (0.57) (0.08) (0.08) 
Married/Cohabiting  0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** -0.10*** -0.10*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Childless  -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* 0.03 0.03 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.25) (0.26) 
Health expenditure   0.46 0.05 0.75* 0.49 -0.82* 
   (0.25) (0.78) (0.07) (0.45) (0.08) 
Dependents   0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.02*** 
   (0.41) (0.54) (0.13) (0.65) (0.00) 
Population   -1.89* -1.13 -2.64** -0.12 3.55** 
   (0.09) (0.25) (0.04) (0.94) (0.02) 
Country-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Break Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 37188 37188 37188 37188 37188 37188 37188 
R-squared 0.09 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.14 0.14 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note: Cluster robust p-values at country level are reported in brackets.           Country level variables take the same lag as the Gini variable.  
          In regressions (5) and (6) numbers show marginal effects or discrete change of dummy variables from 0 to 1;          DV denotes dependent variable 
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5.3.4 Operationalization of the empirical study 2: income inequality and life expectancy 
In contrast to the estimation of self-reported health of individuals, the study of life 
expectancy is operationalized at the country level and estimated as follows:  
    	             =   +                 + 	      	+		   	+ 	     (5.2) 
where     	              is the life expectancy in years for a country c, at time t. As a 
measure of inequality we use the Gini coefficient as well as the S80/S20 indicator, both 
drawn from Eurostat (2013a). As for the analysis on self-reported health, income inequality 
enters equation (5.2) with a two years lag. Furthermore, we include country level variables 
lagged 2 years (W    ) and country fixed effects    in order to control for all time-invariant 
country heterogeneity.  As for the other social outcomes, some robustness checks will be 
carried out to check the sensitivity of the findings to the assumptions underlying the model 
specification.  
Note that in this estimation we do not include break dummies. This is due to the fact that the 
period covered is shorter (i.e. running from 1996 to 2006) than the one employed in the 
empirical analysis on the determinants of self-reported health. For the recent period, we can 
rely on consistent Gini and S80/S20 measures, readily available from Eurostat. Hence, we do 
not need to account for any breaks in the construction of the Gini variable. 
As for the individual level analysis, to estimate the effect of income inequality on life 
expectancy it is necessary to control for other confounding factors. In the following we 
describe the explanatory variables used in the present exercise.  
According to the absolute income hypothesis more wealthy countries are expected to attain 
higher health status than comparably poorer countries. To proxy a country’s income, we use 
the log of GDP per capita measured in constant 2005 international dollars (PPP). We also 
include a measure of a country’s expenditure on health. Data on a country’s total health 
expenditure per capita in dollar PPP is available from the OECD (2012). The variable enters 
equation (5.2) in logarithmic form.  
In addition, we make use of a wide range of additional variables to control for a country’s 
economic and socio-demographic characteristics. In particular, we include an indicator of the 
educational level of the population in the country (gross school enrollment rate in tertiary 
education), an indicator of the female labor market participation (percentage of active women 
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aged 20-64), the age dependency ratio (proportion of people aged 0-15 and 65+ over the 15-
64 year-old population), and a measure for the population size. A description of the variables 
included as well as their label can be found in Table 5.6.  
Table 5.6: Description of Variables  
 Description Source  
Outcome Variables  
Life expectancy Country-level variable on life-expectancy at birth, total (years) World Bank 
(2013)  
Country level control variables 
Gini Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income Eurostat (2013a) 
S80/S20 S80/S20 income quintile share ratio Eurostat (2013a) 
GDP GDP per capita in constant 2005 Intl. Dollar (PPP), in logs World Bank 
(2013) 
Health expenditure Total health expenditure per capita in Dollar PPP, in logs OECD (2012) 
Tertiary education Gross tertiary school enrollment in percent  World Bank 
(2013) 
Female work Percentage of women age 20-64 years that are active in the labor 
market 
Eurostat (2013a) 
Dependents Ratio of people younger than 15 or older than 64 to the working-
age population, i.e. those aged 15-64 years. 
World Bank 
(2013) 
Population Total population, in logs World Bank 
(2013) 
 
Looking at the correlation matrix displayed in Table 5.7, we see that there are a number of 
high correlations between control variables, which might lead to distorted econometric 
findings. In particular, health expenditure and GDP are highly correlated (0.88). In addition, 
tertiary education is highly correlated with health expenditure (0.75) as well as correlated 
with GDP (0.4) and with the dependency ratio (0.4). Last, the dependency ratio is highly 
correlated with health expenditure (0.58). These high correlations suggest that the 
coefficients of the aforementioned variables might not be estimated precisely. Hence various 
robustness checks were carried out to ensure that the results for the Gini variable are not 
driven by multicollinearity issues (see Table 5.8 and Appendix, Table A.5). 
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Table 5.7: Correlation matrix  
 Gini S80s20 GDP Health 
expenditure 
Tertiary 
education 
Female 
work 
Dependents 
Gini        
S80s20 0.9707       
GDP -0.3091 -0.3642      
Health 
expenditure 
-0.2945 -0.3656 0.8737     
Tertiary 
education 
0.0349 0.0117 0.4082 0.7483    
Female 
work 
-0.0676 -0.1345 0.0085 0.2885 0.4380   
Dependents -0.0291 -0.0928 -0.1176 -0.5859 -0.4096 0.2083  
Population 0.1354 0.1448 0.0733 0.0014 0.2210 0.0385 -0.022 
 
5.3.5 Econometric results 2: income inequality and life expectancy 
Country-level estimates of the impact of income inequality on life expectancy are presented 
in Table 5.8. Model of column 1 only controls for the Gini variable and the country fixed 
effects. Subsequently, in estimations 2–7 we include additional country-level variables. 
Finally, columns 8-11 display some robustness checks with respect to (i) different measures 
of income inequality (9), (ii) different time lags for the country level variables and income 
inequality (10-11), and (iii) the exclusion of some highly correlated macroeconomic variables 
(8). Note that additional robustness checks are also displayed in Appendix, Table A5. 
From Table 5.8, we can infer there is not a significant association between income inequality 
and life expectancy, and this independently of the indicator employed (Gini or S80/S20 ratio), 
and of the time lags used for the country-level variables (contemporaneous measures, 2 or 3 
year lags).  Indeed, although the Gini coefficient is positive and significantly different from 
zero in the first estimation (column 1), and then negative and significantly different from zero 
once we control for the GDP per capita (column 2), both findings seem to be spurious as the 
coefficient of the Gini index turns statistically insignificant when we control for other 
country-level variables (estimations 3-7). 
The coefficient of GDP per capita is positive and significant in most estimations and provides 
some evidence that higher GDP per capita is associated with higher life expectancy. In 
addition, as expected, higher expenditure per capita on health is significantly associated with 
higher life expectancy throughout the estimations.  The estimated coefficient for the variable 
female work suggests that higher participation of women in the labor market is positively and 
significantly associated with life expectancy. In addition, the share of dependents is 
positively and significantly associated with life expectancy. Last, the size of the population is 
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not significantly associated with life expectancy, unless inequality is measured by the 
contemporaneous Gini. 
Table 5.8: Results for objective health measure: Life expectancy 
 Main specifications (columns 2-7) Robustness checks (columns 8-11) 
DV: Life-
expectancy 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Gini_L3 
(11) 
Contempor
aneous 
Gini 
Gini 0.09** -0.05* -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.00  0.00 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.08) (0.76) (0.95) (0.76) (0.45) (0.45) (0.77)  (0.83) (0.16) 
S80/S20         0.08   
         (0.21)   
GDP  5.63*** 0.18 0.51 1.61** 2.29*** 2.22** 1.55* 2.34*** 1.45 4.05*** 
  (0.00) (0.79) (0.47) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.06) (0.00) (0.17) (0.00) 
Health    3.67*** 3.77*** 2.55*** 2.70*** 2.73*** 2.48*** 3.20*** 3.01*** 1.64*** 
expenditure   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Tertiary     -0.01* -0.01* -0.01** -0.01**  -0.02*** -0.01** -0.00 
education    (0.06) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.03) (0.71) 
Female      0.09*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.02 0.08*** 0.06** 
work     (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.27) (0.01) (0.01) 
Dependents      0.08* 0.08* 0.04 0.13*** 0.04 0.12*** 
      (0.05) (0.08) (0.31) (0.00) (0.42) (0.01) 
Population       -0.35 -0.55 1.60 -2.36 5.11** 
       (0.88) (0.80) (0.40) (0.39) (0.02) 
            
Country-FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 174 174 139 129 129 129 129 139 187 110 149 
R-squared 0.04 0.55 0.88 0.88 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.94 0.90 0.90 
F-test 5.48 89.39 273.72 188.63 190.33 163.56 138.87 176.93 343.41 111.63 156.73 
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
p-values in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
         Country level variables take the same lag as the Gini variable.  
          DV denotes dependent variable 
As aforementioned some of the time varying country level variables are collinear. In 
particular, health expenditure per capita and GDP per capita are highly correlated to each 
other (0.87), as well as the health expenditure per capita and tertiary education (0.74). In table 
A.5 in Appendix, we display the results obtained when only the health expenditure (column 1) 
or tertiary education (column 2) variable enter in equation (5.2) along with the GINI 
coefficient and the country fixed effects. The Gini coefficient remains insignificant 
throughout the estimations, which confirms the conclusions drawn from Table 5.8. 
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6. Conclusion 
This report constitutes the third deliverable of a comprehensive series of studies initiated by 
the European Commission on the social and economic challenges associated with rising 
income inequalities. The present study provides a multivariate analysis of the effect of 
income inequality on three important social outcomes, i.e. health, social capital, and 
happiness. To arrive at a robust estimation of the effect of income inequality on these social 
outcomes, we have taken great care to construct a dataset that covers the greatest number of 
the EU member states and covers the longest possible time period. In addition, we employ a 
wide number of individual- and country-level control variables, and include a variety of 
robustness checks in our empirical estimations. 
Our study suggests that the adverse effect of income inequality on a plurality of societal 
development challenges as proposed by Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) cannot be confirmed 
by the data, with the important exception of trust. In particular, our analysis cannot 
confirm the hypothesis of a strong and significant effect of income inequality on health, 
happiness and participation in associational activities. The result of no-effect of income 
inequality is robust to the inclusion of a large number of individual- and country-specific 
variables, different time lags of the inequality variable and different functional forms of the 
dependent variables. We believe that Wilkinson and Pickett’s (2009) findings are largely 
driven by the omission of relevant country characteristics that are simultaneously correlated 
with income inequality and the social outcomes. When these country specificities are taken 
into account, the direct effect of income inequality on health, happiness, and associational 
activities vanishes.  
At the same time the analysis carried out in this report suggests that income inequality has a 
potential damaging effect on trust in Europe. A negative association between income 
disparities and generalized trust is reported in all estimations presented in this report. Though 
these findings need to be considered with care given that they might be specific to the 
countries sampled and the time period covered, the implication of a significant effect of 
inequality on trust should not be discounted. According to a variety of scholars, trust is 
critical for the functioning of societies (Putnam, 2000). Social capital and trust are linked 
to cooperative behaviors and investment decisions as well as to the quality of 
institutions, all key factors of economic performance (Knack and Keefer, 1996, and Guiso et 
al 2004). The use of “public trust in politicians” as one of the variables considered in the 
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World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Index (Schwab, 2010) also support the 
importance of trust in the economic sphere. According to Smith (1760, p.86 ), the perception 
of fairness is the “main pillar that upholds the whole edifice […] if it is removed, the great, 
the immense fabric of human society must in a moment crumble to atoms”. If this is true, 
then we should be worried about the consequences of combining both rising income 
inequality and lower trust.  
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APPENDIX A 
Table A.1: Sample for self-reported health estimations, Table 5.5. 
1981-1984 1990-1993 2008-2010 
 Austria Austria 
  Belgium 
 Czech Republic Czech Republic 
Germany Germany Germany 
Denmark Denmark Denmark 
  Estonia 
 Spain Spain 
 Finland Finland 
France France France 
  Greece 
 Hungary Hungary 
Ireland Ireland Ireland 
 Italy Italy 
  Luxembourg 
Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands 
 Poland Poland 
  Portugal 
  Sweden 
  Slovenia 
  Slovakia 
United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom 
 
Table A.2: Correlations between individual-level variables of Table 5.5. 
 
Age Male 
Education
>=19 
Unemplo
yed Retired 
Low 
income 
High 
income Religious 
Married/
Cohabitin
g 
Male -0.010          
Education>=
19 -0.192 0.030        
Unemployed -0.087 0.022 -0.041       
Retired 0.568 0.018 -0.129 -0.096      
Low income 0.119 -0.074 -0.137 0.155 0.182     
High income -0.103 0.056 0.182 -0.108 -0.167 -0.438    
Religious 0.174 -0.123 -0.0584 -0.031 0.092 0.032 -0.071   
Married/Coh
abiting 0.229 0.021 -0.1105 -0.095 0.016 -0.274 0.149 0.102  
Childless -0.475 0.102 0.1816 0.070 -0.158  0.061 -0.013 -0.121 -0.520 
 
 
 
 
86 
 
Table A.3: Correlations between country-level variables of Table 5.5. 
 Health expenditure Dependents 
Dependents -0.004  
Population -0.206 0.109 
 
Table A.4: Results for self-reported health excluding Population 
Regression (3) of Table 5.5 excluding Population 
Gini 0.01** 
 (0.01) 
Age -0.04*** 
 (0.00) 
Age squared 0.00*** 
 (0.00) 
Male 0.05*** 
 (0.00) 
Education>=19 0.09*** 
 (0.00) 
Unemployed -0.16*** 
 (0.00) 
Retired -0.20*** 
 (0.00) 
Low income -0.18*** 
 (0.00) 
High income 0.11*** 
 (0.00) 
Religious -0.01 
 (0.62) 
Married/Cohabiting 0.05*** 
 (0.00) 
Childless -0.03* 
 (0.09) 
Health expenditure -0.13 
 (0.55) 
Dependents -0.00 
 (0.32) 
Time trends Yes 
Break Dummies Yes 
Country-FE Yes 
Number of observations 37188 
R-squared 0.22 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note: Cluster robust p-values at country level are reported in brackets 
          Country level variables take the same lag as the Gini variable.  
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Table A.5: Robustness-checks to Table 5.8 
DV: Life-expectancy (1) (2) 
Gini -0.01 -0.05 
 (0.75) (0.15) 
Health expenditure 3.74***  
 (0.00)  
Tertiary education  0.07*** 
  (0.00) 
Country-FE Yes Yes 
N 139 163 
R-squared 0.88 0.39 
F-test 413.87 42.92 
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 
p-values in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
         Note: Country level variables take the same lag as the Gini variable.  
Table A.6: Correlations between individual-level variables of Table 3.5. 
 
Age 
Age 
squared 
Unem
ployed 
Self-
Employ
ed Retired 
Marrie
d/Coha
biting 
Educati
on  15-
18 
Educatio
n >=19 
Childl
ess 
dumm
y 
Low 
incom
e  
High 
incom
e  
Religi
ous 
Big 
city 
Age 
1.000             
Age 
squared 0.988 1.000            
Unemploy
ed -0.028 -0.037 1.000           
Self-
Employed -0.199 -0.198 -0.719 1.000          
Retired 
0.587 0.641 -0.015 -0.144 1.000         
Married/C
ohabiting -0.098 -0.100 0.062 -0.054 -0.113 1.000        
Education  
15-18 0.136 0.158 0.037 -0.159 0.192 0.146 1.000       
Education 
>=19 -0.121 -0.138 -0.084 0.211 -0.173 -0.110 -0.446 1.000      
Childless 
dummy -0.004 -0.003 0.005 0.019 0.008 0.017 -0.070 0.056 1.000     
Low 
income  0.136 0.136 -0.022 -0.063 0.092 -0.031 0.032 -0.056 -0.131 1.000    
High 
income  0.243 0.195 0.030 -0.096 0.023 -0.082 -0.242 0.142 0.035 0.092 1.000   
Religious 
-0.477 -0.422 -0.067 0.176 -0.170 0.058 0.038 -0.001 0.094 -0.100 -0.521 1.000  
Big city 
-0.050 -0.047 -0.062 0.118 -0.039 -0.016 -0.031 0.066 -0.006 -0.070 -0.081 0.089 1.000 
 
Table A.7: Correlations between macroeconomic variables of Table 3.5. 
 GINI GDP per capita Unemployment rate 
GINI 
1.000   
GDP per capita 
-0.201 1.000  
Unemployment rate 
0.292 -0.152 1.000 
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Table A.8: Correlations between individual-level variables of Table 3.6. 
 
Age 
Age 
squared 
Unem
ployed 
Self-
Employ
ed Retired 
Marrie
d/Coha
biting 
Educati
on  15-
18 
Educatio
n >=19 
Childl
ess 
dumm
y 
Low 
incom
e  
High 
incom
e  
Religi
ous 
Big 
city 
Age 
1.000             
Age 
squared 0.988 1.000            
Unemploy
ed -0.029 -0.037 1.000           
Self-
Employed -0.195 -0.194 -0.719 1.000          
Retired 
0.589 0.643 -0.014 -0.144 1.000         
Married/C
ohabiting 0.137 0.160 0.039 -0.159 0.195 1.000        
Education  
15-18 -0.097 -0.099 0.061 -0.054 -0.114 0.147 1.000       
Education 
>=19 -0.124 -0.141 -0.084 0.211 -0.177 -0.448 -0.111 1.000      
Childless 
dummy -0.006 -0.005 0.005 0.017 0.006 -0.071 0.018 0.056 1.000     
Low 
income 0.142 0.141 -0.024 -0.061 0.096 0.030 -0.030 -0.054 -0.132 1.000    
High 
income 0.237 0.189 0.030 -0.094 0.020 -0.245 -0.082 0.142 0.038 0.096 1.000   
Religious 
-0.473 -0.418 -0.065 0.171 -0.167 0.039 0.058 0.001 0.094 -0.108 -0.515 1.000  
Big city 
-0.044 -0.041 -0.065 0.117 -0.036 -0.029 -0.016 0.066 -0.005 -0.075 -0.076 0.082 1.000 
 
Table A.9: Correlations between macroeconomic variables of Table 3.6. 
 GINI GDP per capita Unemployment rate 
GINI 1.000   
GDP per capita -0.236 1.000  
Unemployment rate 0.290 -0.180 1.000 
 
Table A.10: Correlations between individual-level variables of Table 4.4. 
 
Age 
Age 
square
d 
Unemp
loyed 
Self-
Employ
ed Retired 
Marrie
d/Coha
biting 
Educati
on  15-
18 
Educati
on >=1
9 
Childle
ss 
dummy 
Low 
income  
High 
income  
Religio
us Big city 
Age 1.000             
Age 
squared 0.988 1.000            
Unemplo
yed -0.029 -0.037 1.000           
Self-
Employed -0.199 -0.198 -0.719 1.000          
Retired -0.097 -0.100 0.061 -0.053 1.000         
Married/
Cohabitin
g 0.588 0.642 -0.014 -0.145 -0.113 1.000        
Educatio
n  15-18 0.134 0.157 0.037 -0.159 0.145 0.192 1.000       
Educatio
n >=19 -0.121 -0.138 -0.084 0.211 -0.110 -0.173 -0.447 1.000      
Childless 
dummy -0.004 -0.004 0.005 0.019 0.018 0.007 -0.070 0.055 1.000     
Low 
income 0.138 0.137 -0.022 -0.063 -0.031 0.093 0.031 -0.056 -0.132 1.000    
High 
income 0.246 0.198 0.032 -0.098 -0.082 0.024 -0.241 0.141 0.036 0.094 1.000   
Religious -0.480 -0.426 -0.066 0.176 0.059 -0.171 0.040 -0.001 0.093 -0.102 -0.523 1.000  
Big city -0.053 -0.049 -0.064 0.120 -0.016 -0.040 -0.030 0.065 -0.005 -0.070 -0.082 0.091 1.000 
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Abstract 
The last two decades have seen a growing concern about rising inequality. In a recent book (2012), Economics 
Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz argues that rising income inequality is one of the main factors underlying the 
economic and financial crisis in the United States. Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) similarly assert that higher 
inequality has harmful social consequences. This trend of growing inequality has furthermore been condemned in 
public arenas, where protests in the United States (the “Occupy Wall Street” movement) and in Spain (the 
“indignados”) show the extent of widespread public dissatisfaction with the present system which is denounced as 
being fundamentally flawed and unfair. The “We are the 99%” slogan and the associated web blog “We are the 99 
percent” are direct references to this growing unequal distribution of wealth. A common rallying point of these 
movements is the argument that bankers who have benefited from large bonuses have been protected by bailout 
measures, while the victims of the crisis brought on by these very same bankers are faced with the reality of rising 
unemployment. This has also recently led the EU to agree on capping bonuses to bankers.  
Within this context, the European Commission  decided last year to undertake a comprehensive study on the social 
and economic challenges associated with rising income inequality in Europe. This report constitutes the third 
deliverable of this global study. The first report includes a literature review on the relationship between income 
inequality and social outcome variables in the areas of happiness, criminality, health, social capital, education, 
voting behavior and female labor participation (d'Hombres, Weber, & Elia, 2012). The second report complements 
the literature review by examining the bivariate correlations on NUTS1 level between income inequality and the 
social outcomes mentioned above (Elia, d'Hombres, Weber, & Saltelli, 2013). In this third report, we carry out a 
multivariate analysis on a selected number of social outcomes while controlling for a multitude of individual and 
country level specificities. The social outcomes are social capital, i.e. trust and participation in organizations, 
happiness and health. 
This study suggests that the adverse effect of income inequality on a plurality of societal development challenges 
as proposed by Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) cannot be confirmed by the data, except for the case of trust. In 
particular, our analysis cannot confirm the hypothesis of a strong and significant effect of income inequality on 
health, happiness and participation in associational activities.  
However, we show that income inequality has a potential damaging effect on trust in Europe. A negative 
association between income disparities and generalized trust is reported in all estimations presented in this report. 
Though these findings need to be considered with care given that they might be specific to the countries sampled 
or the time period covered, the implication of a significant effect of inequality on trust should not be discounted. 
According to a variety of scholars, trust is critical for the functioning of societies (Putnam, 2000). Social capital and 
trust are factors which are linked to cooperative behaviors and investment decisions as well as to the quality of 
institutions, which in turn are all key factors of economic performance (Knack and Keefer, 1996, and Guiso et al 
2004). 
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As the Commission’s in-house science service, the Joint Research Centre’s mission is to provide 
EU policies with independent, evidence-based scientific and technical support throughout the 
whole policy cycle. 
 
Working in close cooperation with policy Directorates-General, the JRC addresses key societal 
challenges while stimulating innovation through developing new standards, methods and tools, 
and sharing and transferring its know-how to the Member States and international community. 
 
Key policy areas include: environment and climate change; energy and transport; agriculture 
and food security; health and consumer protection; information society and digital agenda; 
safety and security including nuclear; all supported through a cross-cutting and multi-
disciplinary approach. 
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